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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
917 LUSK, LLC, an Idaho limited liability 
company, 
Peitioner-Appellant, 
vs. 
CITY OF BOISE, a political subdivision in 
the State of Idaho, 
Respondent, 
and 
ROYAL BOULEY ARD ASSOCIATES, 
LP, an Idaho limited partnership, 
Intervenor-Respondent. 
Supreme Court Case No. 41214 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada. 
HONORABLE KATHRYN A. STICKLEN 
RICHARD H. ANDRUS 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
MARY ELIZABETH WATSON 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
GARYG.ALLEN 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
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Date: 8/19/2013 Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County User: TCWEGEKE 
Time: 08:54 AM ROA Report 
Page 1 of 1 Case: CV-OC-2012-08871 Current Judge: Kathryn A. Sticklen 
917 Lusk LLC vs. City of Boise 
917 Lusk LLC vs. City of Boise 
Date Code User Judge 
5/17/2012 NGOC TCORTEJN New Case Filed - Other Claims Kathryn A. Sticklen 
PETN TCORTEJN Petition for Judicial Review Kathryn A. Sticklen 
5/23/2012 OGAP DCLYKEMA Order Governing Judicial Review Kathryn A. Sticklen 
5/25/2012 MOTN CCSWEECE Motion to Intervene By Royal Boulevard Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Associates LP (Gary Allen for Royal Boulevard 
Assoc LP) 
MEMO CCSWEECE Memorandum In Support of Motion to Intervene Kathryn A. Sticklen 
By Royal Boul~vard Associates LP 
AFSM CCSWEECE Affidavit of Joseph Coyle In Support Of Motion to Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Intervene By Royal Boulevard Associates LP 
5/31/2012 NOTC CCSWEECE Notice of Lodging of Transcripts and Record In A Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Judicial Review Pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure 84U) with Boise City Clerk 
6/14/2012 ORDR DCLYKEMA Order on Motion to Intervene Kathryn A. Sticklen 
6/28/2012 NOTC CCWRIGRM Notice of Filing of Transcripts & Record of a Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Judicial Review With the District Court 
NOTC CCWRIGRM Notice of Settling of Transcripts & Record of a Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Judicial Review 
8/2/2012 PETN CCWEEKKG Petitionioner's Brief Kathryn A. Sticklen 
8/30/2012 BREF CCMEYEAR Respondent City of Boise's Brief Opposing Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Petition for Judicial Review 
MISC CCBOYIDR Intervenor Royal Boulevard Associates LP's Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Response Brief 
' RSPS CCHOLMEE Intervenor Royal Boulevard Associates LP's Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Response Brief 
[duplicate entry] 
9/20/2012 RPLY CCBOYIDR Reply Brief Kathryn A. Sticklen 
9/27/2012 NOTH CCMEYEAR Notice Of Hearing (01/17/2013@ 1:30 pm) Kathryn A. Sticklen 
HRSC CCMEYEAR Hearing Scheduled (Petition -01/17/2013 01:30 Kathryn A. Sticklen 
PM) Petition for Judicial Review 
10/4/2012 NOTH CCMEYEAR Notice Of Hearing (11/29/2012@ 1 :30pm) Kathryn A. Sticklen 
HRSC CCMEYEAR Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Kathryn A. Sticklen 
11/29/2012 01 :30 PM) 
11/29/2012 HRHD TCLYCAAM Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled Kathryn A. Sticklen 
on 11/29/2012 01 :30 PM: Hearing Held, 
Reporter: Madsen, less than 100 pages 
1/17/2013 HRVC TCLYCAAM Hearing result for Petition scheduled on Kathryn A. Sticklen 
01/17/2013 01:30 PM: Hearing Vacated Petition 
for Judicial Review 
5/31/2013 MEMO TCWEATJB Memorandum Decision and Order Kathryn A. Sticklen 
7/12/2013 NOTA TCWEGEKE NOTICE OF APPEAL Kathryn A. Sticklen 
APSC TCWEGEKE Appealed To The Supreme Court Kathryn A. Sticklen 
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JoAnn C. Butler, ISB No. 4170 
Richard H. Andrus, ISB No. 7171 
SPINK BUTLER, LLP 
251 E. Front Street, Suite 200 
Boise, Idaho 83702 . 
P.O. Box 639 . 
ND.~1 A.M.:J)J FIL~~-
----
MAY 1 7 2012 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By JOANNA ORTEGA 
DEPUTY 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 388-1000 
Facsimile: (208) 388-1001 
#22868.1 
- · ---~;,_; ~ ·s;t1C\-O_e! · \(P,il-\t-\·l IN /-\. • . __ .- _. 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
917 LUSK, LLC, an Idaho limited liability ) 
company ) 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
CITY OF BOISE CITY, a political 
subdivision in the State of Idaho, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CV .O C: 120887;ttl Case No. _________ _ 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Fee Category: L3 
Filing Fee: $88.00 
Petitioner 917 Lusk, LLC ("Petitioner"), by and through its undersigned counsel of 
record, hereby files the following Petition for Judicial Review related to actions of the City of 
Boise City, as follows: 
I. 
NAME OF THE AGENCY AND APPLICATION FOR WIDCH JUCICIAL REVIEW IS 
SOUGHT 
1. The name of the agency from which judicial review is sought is the City of Boise City 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW · 1 
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(.. ·, 
(the "City"), a political subdivision of the State of Idaho having jurisdiction over land use and 
zoning decisions within the City, by and through its City Council (the "Council"). 
2. The application that resulted in the decision that Petitioner requests this Court to 
review is CUP 11-00090, and the associated applications CFHl 1-00035, CFHl 1-00036, and 
DRH12-00013 (collectively, the "Application"). 
II . 
.JURISDICTION 
3. Petitioner is an "affected person" seeking judicial review of a decision of the City 
(described below), as allowed by Idaho Code Title 67, Chapter 52 (Idaho Administrative 
Procedure Act), Idaho Code Title 67, Chapter 65 (Local Land Use Planning Act), Rule 84 of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and/or the ordinances of the City. 
4. The actions of the City described herein are subject to judicial review under Idaho 
Code Sections 67-6512, 6519, 6521, and 6535. 
III. 
IDSTORY RELEVANT TO PETITION FOR .JUDICIAL REVIEW 
5. Petitioner owns certain real property located in the City commonly known as 917 
Lusk Street. 
6. On or about November 28, 2011, The Michaels Organization (the "Applicant") 
submitted the Application to the City for an exception to the zoned height to construct a student 
housing project at 1004 W. Royal Boulevard. 
7. The change in height requested is nearly thirty feet above than the thirty-five foot 
height allowed in the R-OD (Residential- Office with Design Review) zone where the proposed 
project would be located. 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - 2 
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8. The property where the proposed project would be located is directly adjac~nt to the 
Petitioner's property. 
9. The Boise City Planning & Zoning Commission (the "Commission") was to 
originally hear the Application.on February 6, 2012. 
10. Although several citizens in attendance had signed into to testify on the ma~ter, the 
Commission approved the Application as part of the "Consent Agenda" without hearing any 
testimony on the matter. 
11. On February 13, 2012, the Commission agreed to reconsider the applicatio~ and 
received public testimony. 
12. At a March 5, 2012 hearing, the Commission approved the Applicant's requested 
height increase. 
Petitioner appealed the decision to the Council. 
The Council considered the appeal of the Application on April 17, 2012. 
! 
I 
I 
I 
13. 
14. 
15. On April 25, 2012, the Council issued its Decision Letter denying the appeal and 
upholding the Commission's decision to approve the increased height. 
16. The Council's decision prejudices Petitioner's substantial rights. 
v. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR .JUDICIAL REVIEW 
17. The City's decision to approve the Application and deny the appeal was in excess of 
constitutional or statutory protections, in excess of the City's statutory authority, mad~ upon 
unlawful procedure, not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole, or arbitrary, 
capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - 3 
I 
000006
. . ' . 
18. Petitioner reserves the right to amend and/or supplement this Statement of Issues to 
include other issues later discovered, in accordance with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84(d)(5). 
VI. 
DESIGNATION REGARDING TRANSCRIPTS 
19. The testimony and proceedings should have been recorded, and the City should have 
possession of those recordings at its offices. Petitioner requests preparation of transcripts of the 
Council, Commission, Design Review Committee, and Parks and Recreation Committee 
proceedings. Petitioner agrees to pay estimated and final fees for preparation of certified 
transcripts of the proceedings as required by Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84 and the Idaho 
Administrative Procedure Act. 
VII. 
ATTORNEY CERTIFICATION 
20. Attorneys for Petitioner hereby certify that: 
A. This Petition has been served upon the City, which is the local government 
rendering the decision. \ 
B. Petitioner requests transcripts for the proceedings of the Council, Commission, 
Design Review Committee, and Parks and Recreation Committee. Petitioner 
agrees to timely pay the resulting estimate and fees as required by Idaho Rule 
of Civil Procedure 84. 
C. Petitioner requests an estimated fee for preparation of the record. Petitioner 
agrees to pay the estimated fee calculated by the City Clerk in accordance with 
Rule 84(f)(4). 
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"'. . .. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays for the following: 
1. That the action of the Council upholding the Board's approval of the Application be set 
aside, in whole or in part, that the Board's approval of the Application be set aside, in 
whole or in part, and the Application be remanded to the Board for further proceedings in 
compliance with the applicable statutes and ordinances; 
2. An award of attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-117 or other 
applicable statute or rule; and 
3. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. 
DATED this 17th day of May 2012. 
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By: 12 · \ --A-::AL 
Richard H. Andrus 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 17th day of May 2012, I caused a true and correct copy 
of the above PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW to be served upon the following individuals 
in the manner indicated below: · 
Boise City Clerk 
150 N. Capitol Blvd., 1st Flr., Bldg. 1 
Boise, ID 83702 
P.O. Box 500 
Boise, ID 83701 
Facsimile: 208/384-3711 
Boise City Council 
c/o Mayor's Office 
150 N. Capitol Blvd., 3rd Flr., Bldg. 1 
Boise, ID 83702 
P.O. Box 500 
Boise, ID 83701 
Facsimile: 208/384-4420 
Boise City Attorney's Office 
150 N. Capitol Blvd., 4th Flr., Bldg. 2 
Boise, ID 83702 
P.O. Box 500 
Boise, ID 83701 
Facsimile: 208/384-4454 
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[ ] U.S. Mail 
[X] Hand-Delivery 
[ ] Federal Express 
[ ] Via Facsimile 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[X] Hand-Delivery 
[ ] Federal Express 
[ ] Via Facsimile 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[X] Hand-Delivery 
[ ] Federal Express 
[ ] Via Facsimile 
V ·-\-½-: AL-
Richard H. Andrut" 
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' l 
' Richard H. Andrus, ISBNo. 7171 
JoAnn C. Butler, ISB No. 4170 
SPINK BUTLER, LLP 
251 E. Front Street, Suite 200 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
P.O. Box 639 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 388-1000 
Facsimile: (208) 388-1001 
#22868.1 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
NO·-----;:::-=---z-:9-_,,_"(:lo 
A...,.M ____ R~I-~ :;:;5c:r 
AUG O 2 2012 
CHRISTOPHER O. RICH, Clerk 
By STEPHANIE VIDAK 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
917 LUSK, LLC, an Idaho limited liability ) 
company, ) 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
CITY OF BOISE CITY, a political 
subdivision in the State of Idaho, 
Respondent, 
and 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
ROYAL BOULEVARD ASSOCIATES, ) 
LP, an Idaho limited partnership, ) 
) 
Intervenor. ) 
-------------~ 
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I. 
STATKMENT OF THE PETITION 
This is an appeal from the decision of the Boise City ("City" or "Boise") City Council 
(the "Council") upholding the City's Planning & Zoning Commission's (the "P&Z 
Commission") approval of a conditional use request for a height exception from the limitations 
of the Boise City Zoning Ordinance ("Zoning Ordinance" or "City Code"). The purpose of the 
height exception will permit Royal Boulevard Associates LP ("Intervenor") to construct an 
apartment building (the "Project") to a height exceeding the thirty-five height foot limit 
applicable to buildings in the City's Residential Office District (with Design Review Overlay) 
zone ("R-O zone" or "R-OD zone"). 
Petitioner, being an adversely affected neighboring property owner, contends that the 
City's approval of the conditional use permit adversely affects Petitioner and the public at large 
and is improper because: (i) the P&Z Commission erred in failing to follow the procedure 
established by the City Code and consider testimony required to analyze whether permission for 
a conditional use request was appropriate; (ii) the Council erred in failing to overturn the 
decision of the P&Z Commission in clear violation of City Code Section 11-03-07.05.G; (iii) the 
Council's decision to uphold the P&Z Commission's grant of the conditional use permit was not 
supported by substantial evidence in the record; (iv) the Council's decision to uphold the P&Z 
Commission's grant of the conditional use permit was made upon unlawful procedure; and (v) 
the Council's decision to uphold the P &Z Commission's grant of the conditional use permit was 
arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion. 
PETITIONER'S BRIEF - 5 
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II. 
ST AND ARD OF REVIEW 
The Local Land Use Planning Act, Idaho Code Sections 67-6501 to 67-6538, ("LLUPA") 
allows an affected person to seek judicial review of the approval or denial of a land use 
application, as provided for in the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act, Idaho Code Sections 
67-5201 to 67-5292 ("IAPA"). Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71, 73 P.3d 84 (2003). An 
affected person is one having an interest in real property which may be adversely affected by the 
issuance or denial of a permit authorizing the development. Idaho Code§ 67-6521(1) (a). A 
conditional use permit is an appealable permit under LLUPA. Wohrle v. Kootenai County, 147 
Idaho 267,207 P.3d 998 (2009); Eacret v. Bonner County, 139 Idaho 780, 86 P.3d 494 (2004). 
The decision of a zoning authority will be overturned if the Court finds that the zoning 
authority's findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are (a) in violation of constitutional or 
statutory provisions; (b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (c) made upon 
unlawful procedure; (d) not supported by substantial evidence in the record; or (e) are arbitrary, 
capricious or an abuse of discretion. Idaho Code § 67-5279(3). The requirements of procedural 
due process apply to land use matters, including proceedings on conditional use applications. 
Hawkins v. Bonneville County Bd. of Com'rs, 151 Idaho 228,254 P.3d 1224 (2011); Cowan v. 
Board of Com'rs of Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501, 148 P.3d 1247 (2006). 
The role of the reviewing court is to evaluate the process by which the zoning decision 
was reached, consider whether substantial evidence supported the factual findings, and evaluate 
the soundness of the legal reasoning advanced in support of the decision. Jasso v. Camas 
County, 151 Idaho 790,795,264 P.3d 897, 902 (2011). The approval or denial of a zoning 
application must be vacated when it is not accompanied by a reasoned statement plainly stating 
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the resolution of factual disputes, identifying the evidence supporting that factual determination, 
and explaining the basis for legal conclusions, including identification of the pertinent laws 
and/or regulations upon which the legal conclusions rest must be vacated. Id. 
III. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the decision to grant the conditional use request, and the Council's refusal to 
overturn the P&Z Commission decision, was in excess of the City Code's authority of the 
P&Z Commission and the Council. 
2. Whether the P&Z Commission's decision to grant the conditional use request, and the 
Council's refusal to overturn the P&Z Commission decision, was made upon unlawful 
procedure. 
3. Whether the P&Z Commission's decision to grant the conditional use request, and the 
Council's refusal to overturn the P&Z Commission decision, was not supported by 
substantial evidence in the record. 
4. Whether the P&Z Commission's decision to grant the conditional use request, and the 
Council's refusal to overturn the P&Z Commission decision, was arbitrary, capricious or an 
abuse of discretion. 
5. Whether the "Reason for the Decision" Issued by the P&Z Commission and approved as 
modified by the Council were inadequate under LLUP A and City Code, and thereby violated 
Petitioner's due process rights. 
IV. 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 
On or about November 28, 2011, the Intervenor's predecessor in interest, the Michaels 
Organization ("Applicant"), filed an application with the City requesting approval of a 
PETITIONER'S BRIEF - 7 
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conditional use for a height exception to build a student housing project at 1004 West Royal 
Boulevard in Boise, Idaho. BC-181 to 193. 1 
The P&Z Commission is empowered to grant conditional use requests after imposing any 
conditions needed to mitigate any damages, hazards, nuisances, or other detriments to persons or 
property in the vicinity due to the proposed conditional use. Boise City Code ("BCC') §§ 11-06-
04.01 and 11-06-04.04. The P&Z Commission originally heard the application on February 6, 
2012. BC-70, 195. Although two members of the public had signed up to testify at the hearing, 
in error the P&Z Commission approved the Project as part of its "Consent Agenda" without 
hearing that testimony. BC-70. To rectify the error, the P&Z Commission reconsidered its 
decision and held another hearing. BC-70, 223. On February 13, 2012, the P&Z Commission 
heard from City staff ("Staff'), Applicant's representatives, and Petitioner's representative. BC-
223 to 226. The P&Z Commission then continued the hearing to March 5, 2012. BC-226 to 
227. 
At its March 5 hearing, the P&Z Commission refused to consider testimony on adverse 
impacts associated with the conditional use request and refused to appropriately condition the 
request for a height exception as required under LLUPA and City Code. Idaho Code§ 67-6512; 
BCC §§ 11-06-04.01, 11-06-04.13, 11-06-04.14, and 11-06-06.12. Staff wrongly instructed the 
P&Z Commission that: "The application tonight only concerns the additional height requested by 
the applicant", and that potentially negative impacts, such as parking, were not an "issue before 
the Commission." BC-112. 
1 Idaho Appellate Rule 35 requires references to the record to follow certain conventions. To avoid confusion, this 
Petitioner's Brief uses the bates page numbering convention used by the City. 
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The P&Z Commission then approved the conditional use application for a height 
exception at its March 5, 2012 hearing. BC-106 to 111. On March 15, 2012, Petitioner timely 
appealed the P&Z Commission's decision to the Council. BC-80. The Council held a hearing 
on the appeal on April 17, 2012. BC-32 to 55. The Council denied the appeal and upheld the 
approval of the conditional use for the height exception. BC-284 to 287. Petitioner thereafter 
timely filed its Petition for Judicial Review. 
v. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In fall 2011, Applicant applied to the City of Boise for permission to build a student 
housing project at 1004 West Royal Boulevard in Boise, Idaho. BC-184 to 193. The proposed 
Project consists of a housing structure for Boise State University students approximately 352,000 
square feet in size and with a footprint that would occupy the majority of approximately 3.4 
acres directly adjacent to the Boise River Greenbelt (the "Greenbelt"), Ann Morrison Park, and 
Petitioner's property. BC-181, 195. The proposed Project would be located in the City's R-OD 
zone. BC-195. 
The City's Zoning Ordinance prohibits buildings over thirty-five feet in the R-OD zone. 
BCC § 11-04-05.05; Table 2. Applicant could only construct the Project at its proposed height of 
between fifty-nine and sixty-three feet- nearly double the thirty-five-foot height allowed in the 
R-OD zone-if the City permitted the additional height after analyzing this now conditional use 
under the City Code process. BC-70; BCC §§ 11-04-05.05, 11-06-04.01, 11-06-04.13, 11-06-
04.14, and 11-06-06.12. 
The 1997 Boise City Comprehensive Plan (the "Comprehensive Plan") was in effect at 
the time Applicant's application was filed. The Comprehensive Plan incorporates by reference 
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the Downtown Boise Plan (the "Downtown Plan"). Comprehensive Plan p. 8-33.2 The 
Downtown Plan provided guidance for a strong "Implementation Program," Downtown Plan p. 
xv et seq., including zoning amendments necessary to implement the Downtown Plan. Id. The 
Downtown Plan stated that the "City should create and adopt a new Residential-Office (R-O) 
zoning district. . .intended to serve as a transitional buffer between the CBD and adjacent 
neighborhoods." Downtown Plan p. xvi. The City did create the new R-O zone. See, BCC § 11-
04-05. The implementation of the Downtown Plan involved the rezone of large portions of the 
City's downtown in order to ensure downtown zoning would: "comply with and conform to 
the ... goals and policies under the ... Downtown Policy Plan [; and] maintain and preserve 
compatibility of surrounding zoning and development." Boise City Ordinance No. 5475. In 
other words, the City's implementation program was undertaken to ensure the zoning of the 
properties in downtown was in accordance with the Comprehensive Plan. 
As part of the Downtown Plan's implementation program, the subject property was one 
of many properties deliberately rezoned from a zone that would have allowed-by right-
building heights above thirty-five feet to the R-OD where building heights above thirty-five feet 
are only allowed through the conditional use process. Boise City Council Meeting Transcript 04-
17-12_2 ("Transcript 4-17-12") pp. 3-4.3 This was a striking change by the City. The City 
consciously implemented the Downtown Plan by downzoning what had been the allowed the 
height on many properties such as the subject property-immediately adjacent to the Greenbelt 
2 The Comprehensive Plan was revised during the course of proceeding at the City. The Downtown Plan was, again, 
adopted and incorporated by reference into the revised Comprehensive Plan. The 1997 Boise City Comprehensive 
Plan and Downtown Plan have been provided to the Court for ease of reference. 
3 Idaho Appellate Rule 35 requires references to transcripts to follow certain convention. To avoid confusion, the 
Petitioner's Brief uses the page numbering convention used by the City. 
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and Ann Morrison Park. See, BCC § 11-04-05 .05; Table 2.2A; Transcript 4-17-12 pp. 3-4. 
t:.,, 
This implementing R-O zone does allow for some flexibility in height, but only with strict 
compliance with the City's conditional use process. 
As part of the Downtown Plan's implementation program, at the same time that the 
subject property was rezoned to be consistent with the Downtown Plan, Petitioner's property, 
which is located immediately east and south of the proposed Project and away from Ann 
Morrison Park, was rezoned BC-81. Similarly, other properties in the vicinity not located 
adjacent to Ann Morrison Park were also rezoned. Boise City Ordinance No. 5475. However, 
Petitioner's property and these other properties were rezoned to a zone (General Commercial 
with Design Review or C-2D) that maintained the same forty-five foot height that existed prior 
to the rezone. Id.; see also BCC § 11-04-05.05. The City drew a line: properties along Ann 
Morrison Park were only allowed a maximum height of thirty-five feet; properties further east of 
Ann Morrison Park, were allowed a maximum height of forty-five feet. Transcript 4-17-12 pp 3-
7. Again, it is not that the R-O zone properties, like the subject property, cannot be developed 
above thirty-five feet. However, the developers of those properties, and the City, must first 
conduct the conditional use procedure found in City Code. 
Petitioner's building serves the employees of Keynetics and is a three-story Class A 
office building located in the C2-D zone with a base maximum height of forty-five feet. BC-
228. Petitioner requested and received a conditional use permit for a height exception, which 
varies the roofline for design purposes and to accommodate stair towers. BC-83. That 
additional height, considered on its own merits as a conditional use, is not habitable space, but 
rather serves design and aesthetic considerations. BC-83. On the other hand, the height 
exception requested by Applicant would add two stories of residential units to the Project, which 
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is double the number of residential stories the Project would include if it complied with the 
thirty-five foot height limit in the R-OD zone. Transcript 4-17-12 p. 4; BC-141, 229 to 231, and 
247. 
At its March 5, 2012 hearing, on instruction from Staff, the P&Z Commission did not 
consider adverse impacts of the Project due to parking. BC- 112. The overwhelming evidence 
presented at the hearing and in written materials submitted to the P&Z Commission 
demonstrated that the Project was severely under-parked and the parking would adversely impact 
surrounding property owners. BC-123 to 124,229 to 231, and 247. The additional height 
attributable to the conditional height exception would add two full stories of residences to the 
Project above what is permitted as an allowed use under the City Code. BC-141, 229 to 231, and 
247. The Project would contain 622 bedrooms and house at least 622 student tenants, but only 
provide 280 parking spaces. BC-229 to 231, and 247. 
Parking around the Project is already strained. Ann Morrison Park hosts a variety of high 
traffic events throughout the year. BC-229 to 231, and 247. During the summer river floating 
season, soccer season, and other sports seasons, parking in Ann Morrison Park and along Royal 
Boulevard becomes heavily congested. BC-229 to 231, and 247. The inadequate parking will 
make the proposed Project an undesirable place to live, adversely affect the businesses in the 
area, and harm the public's ability to enjoy Ann Morrison Park and the Boise River Greenbelt. 
BC-229 to 231, and 247. Students that cannot find parking within the housing Project will park 
at adjacent properties, including Petitioner's property. BC-84 to 88. As a result, Petitioner and 
other property owners will be forced to expend considerable time and resources policing the 
parking on their properties. BC-229 to 231. Congested parking will drive customers away from 
businesses in the area. BC-229 to 231. 
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On March 5, 2012 the P&Z Commission approved Applicant's conditional use request 
for a legal exception. BC-106-111. 
On March 15, 2012, the Petitioner timely appealed the P&Z Commission decision to the 
City Council. BC-80 to 95. 
On April 17, 2012, the Council upheld the P&Z Commission decision. BC-284 to 287. 
VI. 
ST ANDING OF PETITIONER 
"An affected person aggrieved by a final decision concerning matters identified in 
Section 67-6521(1)(a), Idaho Code, may within twenty-eight (28) days after all remedies have 
been exhausted under local ordinances seek judicial review as provided by Chapter 52, Title 67, 
Idaho Code." Idaho Code§ 67-6521(1) (d). An "affected person" means "one having a bona 
fide interest in real property which may be adversely affected by: (i) the approval, denial or 
failure to act upon an application for a subdivision, variance, special use permit and such other 
similar applications required or authorized pursuant to this chapter ... " Idaho Code § 67-
6521 ( 1 )( a)(i). The action of the Council, upholding the P&Z Commission's approval of 
Applicant's request for a height increase under the conditional use permit criteria, is a final 
decision subject to judicial review. Canal/Norcrest/Columbus Action Committee v. City of 
Boise, 136 Idaho 666, 39 P.3d 606 (2001). 
Petitioner is an affected person having an interest in real property immediately adjacent 
to the proposed Project and adversely affected by the approval of a conditional use request for an 
increase in height. Johnson v. Blaine County, 146 Idaho 916,920,204 P.3d 1127, 1131 (2009) 
(adjoining property owner affected by increased housing density is viewed as an affected 
person); Taylor v. Canyon County Bd. Of Com 'rs, 147 Idaho 424, 210 P.3d 532 (2009) (standing 
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satisfied by neighboring landowner); Cowan v. Board of Com'rs of Fremont County, 143 Idaho 
501, 148 P.3d 1247 (2006) (standing satisfied by landowners affected by adjacent subdivision 
development); Davisco Foods International, Inc. v. Gooding County, 141 Idaho 784, 118 P.3d 
116 (2005) (standing satisfied because petitioners might smell proposed wastewater treatment 
plant over three miles distant); Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71, 73 P.3d 84 (2003) (standing 
satisfied by rural home owners affected by resort development). 
The most immediate, real, significant, and anticipated adverse consequence to Petitioner 
and other property owners in the neighborhood (including the public who travel to and use Ann 
Morrison Park) is the parking crisis created by the City's approval of an additional two stories of 
habitable apartments over and above the allowed height of thirty-five feet in the R-OD zone - all 
without appropriate conditions being placed on the conditional use request to ensure that adverse 
impacts are mitigated. In fact, there was no discussion, no analysis, and no deliberation by the 
City to review the potential adverse parking impacts caused by this additional habitable 
apartments that are not allowed by right under the Zoning Ordinance. 
The lack of deliberation by the City, and the failure of the City to attach appropriate 
conditions to this conditional use approval (assuming, solely for arguments sake, that the 
conditional use could even be appropriately conditioned so as to mitigate adverse impacts), will 
devalue Petitioner's property, require time and expense for Petitioner to police parking on its 
own property, inconvenience employees and visitors to Petitioner's building, cause similar 
deleterious consequences to the neighborhood around the Project, potentially drive business from 
the neighborhood, and cause adverse consequences for patrons of Ann Morrison Park. 
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VII. 
ARGUMENT 
A. General Rules Regarding Conditional Use Permit Requests. 
Conditional uses are land uses that a governing body previously determined includes 
characteristics that might render the use unsuitable as requested by an applicant. Such 
characteristics may include increases in height that increase habitable space and all the attendant 
issues from the increase in the number of people residing on and parking their cars on or near a 
particular piece of property. 
Permission to develop a conditional use, cannot, legally, be granted without compliance 
with LLUPA's enabling legislation and the City Code. Under LLUPA: 
As part of a zoning ordinance, each governing board may provide by 
ordinance . . . for the processing of applications for . . . special or conditional 
use permits. A special use permit may be granted to an applicant if the 
proposed use is conditionally permitted by the terms of the ordinance, subject 
to conditions pursuant to specific provisions of the ordinance, subject to the 
ability of political subdivisions, including school districts, to provide services 
for the proposed use, and when it is not in conflict with the plan. 
Idaho Code§ 67-6512(a). The City adopted conditional use permit review procedures for height 
exceptions. See BCC §§11-06-04, 11-06-06.12, 11-06-06.13, and 11-06-06.14. 
The stated "general intent" of the Zoning Ordinance is to require conformity within 
zoning districts, BCC § 11-04-02.01, and buildings in any district are to be used only in 
accordance with the regulations established for that district. Id. In the R-0 zone, the City has set 
a maximum height of thirty-five feet. BCC § 11-04-05.05. Roof line features in the R-O zone 
are allowed to vary slightly above this maximum building height and within strict parameters. 
BCC § 11-04-05.06.A. Any other extension of height above the thirty-five foot maximum is 
possible only if an applicant obtains conditional use approval from the P&Z Commission. That 
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P&Z Commission approval, if granted, "shall be based upon the criteria set forth in [BCC] 
Section 11-06-04.13." BCC § 11-06-06.12 (emphasis added); see also BCC § 11-04-05.06.D. 
A multifamily building in the R-O zone is an allowed use when it is built to a height of 
thirty-five feet. A multifamily building in the R-O zone built above thirty-five feet is a 
conditional use, and, by the City's own legislative determination, "[ c ]onditional uses by 
definition possess characteristics such as to require review and appraisal by the [P&Z] 
Commission to determine whether or not the use would cause any damage, hazard, nuisance or 
other detriment to persons or property in the vicinity." BCC § 11-06-04.01. 
Review and appraisal by the P&Z Commission occurs at a public hearing,·and 
"[f]ollowing the hearing, the [P&Z] Commission shall approve, deny or modify the application 
for a conditional use permit, imposing any conditions needed to establish the findings of [BCC] 
Section 11-06-04.11. [sic: 11-06-04.13]" BCC § 11-06-04.04 (emphasis added). Further, the 
City requires the P&Z Commission, "in acting upon the application, shall provide that approval 
of a conditional use permit shall be contingent upon c~mpliance with specified conditions."4 
BCC § 11-06-04.14 (emphasis added). Once a land use- such as the proposed Project-has 
been classified by the City as a conditional use, the duty arises for the P&Z Commission to 
protect the public's welfare through rigorous compliance with the adopted procedures. 
Conditional use permits by definition are not granted as a mere matter of course. The 
City's Zoning Ordinance contemplates that a full hearing on a conditional use application will 
occur. A hearing in which neighbors who know their neighborhood well, such as Petitioner, can 
provide testimony to the P&Z Commission on potential negative impacts that the requested 
4 The Zoning Ordinance (BCC § 11-06-04.14) actually specifies a list of conditions that, "without limitation" the 
P&Z Commission is to use to condition any particular conditional use application to mitigate potential "damage, 
hazard, nuisance or other detriment to persons or property in the vicinity." See BCC § 11-06-04.01. 
PETITIONER'S BRIEF - 16 
000025
conditional use may impose on the neighborhood. A hearing in which the P&Z Commission 
would take all that testimony and would review and appraise the application in light of that 
testimony. A hearing in which the P&Z Commission would deliberate toward a decision using 
that testimony and, if the conditional use request was approved, that approval would be 
contingent on conditions of approval that would mitigate the adverse impacts of the conditional 
use. 
B. The P&Z Commission Erred By Not Following The City's Conditional Use 
Procedure. 
The procedure contemplated by the Zoning Ordinance was not followed in this instance. 
Idaho Code Section 67-6512(a) enables local governments to establish, by ordinance, a process 
for reviewing and appraising conditional use requests. The City established by ordinance that 
procedure, but did not follow its procedure. Petitioner understands the judiciary will in general 
defer to a local government's factual findings. In this case, the City refused to gather and 
deliberate on many of the facts, all of which facts form the basis for conclusions of law set out in 
the City's conditional use criteria. BCC § 11-06-04.13. 
The conditions of approval attached to an approved conditional use request must include 
those conditions the P&Z Commission determines will allow the P&Z Commission to reach the 
following conclusions of law: 
A. That the location of the proposed use is compatible to other uses in the general 
neighborhood; and 
B. That the proposed use will not place an undue burden on transportation and 
other public facilities in the vicinity; and 
C. That the site is large enough to accommodate the proposed use and all yards, 
open spaces, pathways, walls and fences, parking, loading, landscaping and 
such other features as are required by this title; and 
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D. That the proposed use, if it complies with all conditions imposed, will not 
adversely affect other property of the vicinity; and 
E. That the proposed use is in compliance with and supports the goals and 
objectives of the Comprehensive Plan. 
F. Multiple family building (any building containing more than 2 residential 
units) must be designed to include features which add to the visual and 
aesthetic appearance of the structure and help prevent a sterile, box-like 
appearance .... 
BCC § 11-06-04.13. 
In acting on a conditional use permit application, the P&Z Commission "shall provide 
that approval of a conditional use permit shall be contingent upon compliance with specified 
conditions." BCC § 11-06-04.14; see also Idaho Code§ 67-6512(d). Among those conditions 
that shall apply are "requirements for off-street parking." BCC § 11-06-04.14.C. Thus, merely 
meeting the Zoning Ordinance's off-street parking requirements for an allowed use (as compared 
to a conditional use) does not necessarily satisfy the off-street parking requirements that may be 
needed after analyzing a particular conditional use request. The City must go through the 
legislatively-demanded procedure to analyze whether parking must be conditioned. The 
language of City Code Section 11-06-04.14.C requires an examination of the off-street parking 
for any conditional use permit application. The P&Z Commission must consider all of the 
particulars of the proposed Project, including parking, and, as necessary, attach conditions of 
approval regarding off-street parking. 
However, in this case, the P&Z Commission treated this conditional use request as 
though the building, at the height requested, only needed to meet the parking standards 
automatically applicable to allowed uses. The P&Z Commission concluded that: 
The height exception will not adversely affect surrounding property owners as the building's 
additional height does not allow for more units than the site's available parking .... The 
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height exception allows for the applicant to maximize the number of units, while providing 
for adequate parking. 
BC-108. The purpose of the conditional use procedure is to take a rigorous look at the potential 
adverse effects a particular conditional use request may have on its surroundings and condition 
the request accordingly. In this case, the P&Z Commission did not go through that exercise but 
made the conclusory statement that there was adequate parking in order for Applicant to get the 
most units out of the site as possible. 
On several occasions during the conditional use process and appeal, Staff asked the P&Z 
Commission and Council to compare the Project to other buildings "in the area" of the Project 
that are similar height to the proposed Project. BC-199, 213. In its efforts to conjure an image 
of compatibility, Staff failed to explain that the buildings Staff specifically referred to are not 
located in the same zone as the Project and are not located "in the area." BC-70, 82 to 83, and 
199. In fact, one of the buildings referenced by Staff is across the river and two of the 
buildings-the Morrison Center at sixty-three feet high and the Barnes Towers at seventy-four 
feet high - are located nearly one-third mile from the proposed Project, across two major 
roadways (9th Street and Capitol Boulevard) on the Boise State University Campus, and most 
importantly, in the "University" or "U" land use zone that allows, by right, a height of seventy-
five feet. BC-83. 
Staff also used the height of Petitioner's building and Petitioner's height exception to 
claim compatibility between the proposed Project and the surrounding area. Yet Staff failed to 
explain to the P&Z Commission that Petitioner's building is located in the C2-D zone away from 
the public's park and on the other side of the zoning boundary that the City deliberately drew 
when the City implemented the Downtown Plan. BC-83, 199; Boise City Ordinance No. 5475. 
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Staff further failed to point out that Petitioner's height exception was judged on its own merits 
under the City's conditional use procedure, which is what should be expected in this instance. 
The Project, at the height requested, arguably may be compatible with other buildings in 
the area. The issue is whether, at the height requested, the Project is adequately parked or must 
be conditioned so that the Project "will not adversely affect other property in the vicinity." BCC 
§§ 11-06-04.13.D and 11-06-04.14.C. 
At its March 5, 2012 hearing, on instruction from Staff, the P&Z Commission refused to 
consider adverse impacts of the Project due to parking. Staff instructed the P&Z Commission 
that "[t]he application tonight only concerns the additional height requested by the applicant", 
and that potentially negative impacts required to be considered for conditional use requests, such 
as the need for additional on-site parking exacerbated by the additional two stories of habitable 
space the height exception would permit, was not an "issue before the Commission." BC-112. 
After the public testimony portion of the hearing was closed and the P&Z Commission began 
deliberating toward a decision, Commissioner Stevens, the P&Z Commission chair, stated: 
I want to remind the Commissioners that the parking issue tonight is not actually 
before us. This Commission is not in position to make findings that require our 
applicant to be held to standards above that which is in our code. That would be 
arbitrary and would make the City be in some serious hot water, so I want to 
make sure that when we have our discussion tonight. that we keep the parking out 
of it. It is not before us. 
BC-126 ( emphasis added). Commissioner Story affirmed Commissioner Stevens' position and 
stated that "parking is off the table." BC-126. The Commissioners were wrong to conclude that 
discussion of parking would be "arbitrary." What was arbitrary was that the P&Z Commission 
did not consider the potential negative effects and the possible need to condition the Project to 
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provide additional parking. What was arbitrary was that the Project was treated by the P&Z 
Commission as though it was an allowed use and not the conditional use that it is. 
· Despite that the P&Z Commission was instructed to not consider the parking problems, 
and despite that the P&Z Commission expressly stated that it would not consider the parking 
problems, the "Reason for the Decision" prepared by Staff and approved by the Council stated 
"the public record from the Planning and Zoning Commission meeting revealed a robust 
discussion regarding parking." BC-285, 263, and 272-273. The statement contains no support in 
the record and contradicts what the P&Z Commission said and did. There was no such 
deliberation by the P&Z Commission. 
The P&Z Commission acted upon unlawful procedure based on the requirements of City 
Code Sections 11-06-06.12, 11-06-04.01, 11-06-04.04, 11-06-04.13, and 11-06-04.14. Because 
the P&Z did not even consider the evidence in the record related to parking, the conditional use 
decision cannot be supported by substantial evidence in the record. Finally, the P&Z 
Commission's express disregard for the parking problems when the City Code specifically 
requires the P&Z Commission to consider parking effects on the surrounding neighborhood 
demonstrates it actions were clearly arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion. 
C. The Council Erred When It Upheld the P&Z Commission's Decision to Approve the 
Conditional Use Permit. 
City Code sets forth the procedure and standards for appeals from P&Z Commission 
decisions: When "there is not substantial evidence to support the findings upon which the 
original decision is based, the decision shall be reversed. The City Council shall substitute its 
own findings when the findings from the [P&Z Commission] are not supported by substantial 
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evidence." BCC § 11-03-07.05.G.4. Further, the Council may "remand the matter for further 
proceedings if a "substantial procedural error has taken place." BCC § 11-03-07.05.G.6. 
The Council upheld the P&Z Commission's approval of the conditional use permit based 
on a completely incorrect statement of what occurred before the P&Z Commission. When the 
Council deliberated on the appeal, the Council Member's statements show that the Council 
Members were completely unaware that the P&Z Commission was instructed by Staff not to 
consider parking issues and that the P&Z Commission expressly refused to consider and address 
parking issues. Compare BC-285 with Transcript 7-14-12 pp. 35-37. 
The statements from Council Members when they heard Petitioner's appeal on the P&Z 
Commissioner's lack of thorough conditional use review and deliberation indicate that the 
Council either missed the error of the P&Z Commission or that the Council found it incredulous 
to think the P&Z Commission would not have deliberated appropriately. Council Member 
Jordan stated: "there was no indication in the record of uh concern on the part of the 
Commissions [sic] that they perhaps were not receiving complete information to deliberate 
properly." Transcript 4-17-12 p. 35. Council Member McLean stated: "I saw on the record a lot 
of conversation about parking .... " Transcript 4-17-12 p. 36. Council Member Clegg opined that 
"I find it hard to believe that in this many hearings um if there were issues to be brought up that 
they weren't brought up ... I'm convinced given the record at hand that the Planning and Zoning 
Commission did fully uh consider those." Transcript 4-17-12 p. 37. 
But, in fact, the P&Z Commission did not "consider those." No matter how much 
evidence regarding parking was brought before the P&Z Commission, the P&Z Commission was 
expressly instructed by Staff to not consider any of it and the P&Z Commission did not consider 
the testimony. The Council was in error. 
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The Council's approved "Reason for the Decision" states "the public record from the 
Planning and Zoning P&Z Commission meeting revealed a robust discussion regarding parking." 
BC-285. The statement is manufactured out of thin air. The statement is certainly not based on 
the record which underscores the fact that no such "robust" discussion occurred. BC-112 and 
BC-126. Hence, the Council's decision to uphold the P&Z Commission's approval violated the 
standard of review set forth in City Code Section 11-03-07 .05. BCC § 11-03-07 .05. The P&Z 
Commission's approval and the Council's decision to uphold that decision were made upon 
unlawful procedure, not supported by substantial evidence in the record, and arbitrary, 
capricious, and an abuse of discretion. 
D. The P&Z Commission's "Reason for the Decision," Which the Council Approved as 
Modified, Fails to Meet the Requirements of Idaho Code Section 67-6535 and 
Violates Petitioner's Due Process Rights. 
The "Reason for the Decision" issued by the P&Z Commission and approved as modified by 
the Council simply fails to meet the basic requirements of a reasoned written statement required by 
LLUPA. See BC-106-111, 263 and 284. Idaho Code Section 67-6535(2) provides: 
The approval or denial of any application required or authorized pursuant to this 
chapter shall be in writing and accompanied by a reasoned statement that explains 
the criteria and standards considered relevant, states the relevant contested facts 
relied upon, and explains the rationale for the decision based on the applicable 
provisions of the comprehensive plan, relevant ordinance and statutory 
provisions, pertinent constitutional principles and factual information contained in 
the record. 
Idaho Code § 67-6535(2). The reasoned statement "must plainly state the resolution of factual 
disputes, identify the evidence supporting that factual determination, and explain the basis for 
legal conclusions, including identification of the pertinent laws and/or regulations upon which 
the legal conclusions rest." Jasso v. Camas County, 151 Idaho 790,794,264 P.3d 897, 901 
(2011). Due process requires that parties be afforded a meaningful opportunity for judicial 
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review, and the "reasoned statement" requirement means that decision-makers must articulate the 
basis for their decision to permit meaningful judicial review. Id. at 797,264 P:3d at 904. 
In the present case, the P&Z Commission expressly refused to resolve factual disputes in 
the conditional use procedure. For the P&Z Commission, using parking as the example, granting 
Applicant's height exception request "allows for the applicant to maximize the number of units", 
BC -108, and justifies this through the conclusory statement that Applicant is "providing 
adequate parking." Id. Because the P&Z Commission committed that foundational error, the 
written findings do not reflect the standard set forth in Idaho Code Section 67-6535 as further 
explained in Jasso. 
The Council, in issuing its own "Reason for the Decision" that adopted the P&Z 
Commission statements, compounded the error. BC-284 to 287. The Council not only ignored 
the correct procedure for reviewing a conditional use as well as the factual evidence presented to 
the P&Z Commission regarding the parking problems, but it also completely ignored what the 
record clearly showed-that the P&Z Commission had refused to consider parking and the 
adverse effects created by the Project. Merely stating that a "robust" discussion occurred at the 
P&Z Commission level does not make it so. Such conclusory and false statements do not satisfy 
the Idaho Code Section 67-6535 due process requirements to provide a meaningful judicial 
review. 
vm. 
THE SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS OF PETITIONER HA VE BEEN PREJUDICED BY THE 
CITY GRANTING THE CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT WITHOUT FOLLOWING 
PROPER PROCEDURE. 
The errors made in the City's decision to grant a conditional use permit to Applicant for a 
height exception that will almost double the height of an adjacent apartment building have 
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prejudiced Petitioner's substantial rights. As described above, Petitioner is an affected person 
having an interest in real property that will be adversely affected by the approval of the 
conditional use permit. Affected persons, such as Petitioner, hold a substantial right to procedural 
regularity and due process. 
"[E]veryone with a statutory interest in the outcome of a decision is entitled to a 
meaningful notice and a fair hearing before an impartial decision maker." Hawkins v. Bonneville 
County Bd. of Com'rs, 151 Idaho 228,233,254 P.3d 1224, 1229 (2011) (citing Eacret v. Bonner 
Cnty., 139 Idaho 780,787, 86 P.3d 494, 501 (2004); Eddins v. City of Lewiston, 150 Idaho 30, 
36, 244 P.3d 174, 180 (2010)). Additionally, "all the parties involved in a land-use decision 
have a substantial right to a reasonably fair decision-making process. Governing boards owe 
procedural fairness not just to applicants but also their interested opponents. Both should expect 
proceedings that are free from procedural defects that might reasonably have affected the final 
outcome." Hawkins, 151 Idaho at 232,254 P.3d at 1228 (citing Noble v. Kootenai Cnty., 148 
Idaho 937, 942-43, 231 P.3d 1034, 1039-40 (2010)). Thus, due process and a procedurally fair 
decision are substantial rights of a non-applicant petitioner. See Hawkins, 151 Idaho at 233, 254 
P.3d at 1228 (2011); Jasso, 151 Idaho at 794, 264 P.3d at 901 ("due process rights are substantial 
rights") (quoting Eddins, 150 Idaho at 36, 244 P.3d at 180). 
Throughout the administrative process at the City, the City sent Petitioner the message 
that its participation in the process was nothing more than a nuisance-a bump in the road 
toward approval of Applicant's request. Petitioner has a substantial interest in the outcome of 
the application and was substantially prevented from meaningfully participating in the review 
process. Most importantly, the City expressly refused to consider information required under the 
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procedure established in the City's own Zoning Ordinance for review and conditioning of a 
conditional use permit. BCC §§ 11-06-04.01, 11-06-04.13, 11-06-04.14.C, and 11-06-06.12. 
The City violated Petitioner's due process rights by failing to adopt adequate findings of 
fact to show support for the conclusions of law the City is required to reach under City Code. 
BCC § 11-06-04.13; see also BCC § 11-06-04.14. The City specifically did not address the 
conditional use criteria established in City Code. The failure to adopt such findings and 
conclusions, alone, is sufficient to prejudice a substantial right of Petitioners. Jasso v. Camas 
City, supra. 
Finally, the City was required to attach any necessary conditions of approval to mitigate 
any damages, hazards, nuisances, or other determents. BCC § 11-06-04.14. When the P&Z 
Commission and then the Council just plain refused to consider parking, refused to recognize 
and deliberate on the potential adverse impacts, even though such is required by City Code, the 
substantial rights of Petitioner, specifically, and the public, generally, were violated. 
IX. 
PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES 
Idaho Code Section 12-117 provides that a petitioner in a petition for judicial review shall 
be awarded reasonable attorneys' fees, witness fees, and other expenses when the zoning 
authority acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. Idaho Code § 12-117(1) and (5). The 
City acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law when the City failed to follow City Code 
procedures for consideration of Applicant's conditional use request or provide written findings 
that satisfy Idaho Code Section 67-6535. Under Idaho Code Section 12-117, Petitioner, as the 
prevailing party, is entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys' fees. Idaho Code§ 12-117. 
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x. 
CONCLUSION 
The City committed procedural and due process errors that require the Court to vacate the 
Council's decision and the P &Z Commission's approval of the conditional use permit 
application. Petitioner respectfully requests that the Court vacate the Council's decision and the 
P&Z Commission's approval and remand the matter back to the P&Z Commission instructing 
the P&Z Commission to consider all of the of the matters required by City Code Sections 11-06-
04.13 and 11-06-04.14. Petitioners also respectfully request an award of attorneys' fees as the 
prevailing party. 
DATED this 2nd day of August 2012. 
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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case is an appeal from the determination by the Boise City Council ("City Council") 
upholding a decision by the Boise City Planning and Zoning Commission ("P&Z") which 
approved a conditional use permit ("CUP") for a height exception for Royal Boulevard 
Associates, LP ("Intervenor") to build a multi-family apartment complex called the River Edge 
Apartments ("River Edge"). 1 
On March 5, 2012, the P&Z unanimously approved the River Edge CUP for .a height 
exception and adopted reasons for the decision and conditions of approval.2 917 Lusk, LLC 
("Petitioner") filed a timely appeal of the P&Z's decision to the City Council, asserting that the 
P&Z decision failed to meet the requirements for a CUP.3 On April 17, 2012, the City Council 
denied the appeal and upheld the P&Z's approval of the height exception.4 
The subject site is 1004 West Royal Boulevard, to the east of Boise's Ann Morrison Park 
and to the west of the property owned by Petitioner.5 Multi-family dwellings are an allowed use 
for this location6 as the property is currently zoned as Residential Office with a Design Review 
Overlay ("R-OD").7 The Local Land Use Planning Act ("LLUPA")8 and the Boise City Zoning 
1 R. pp. BC 284-287. 
2 R. pp. BC 106-111. 
3 R. pp. BC 82-89. 
4 R. pp. BC 284-287. 
5 R. p. BC-162. . 
6 Boise City Code § 11-04-05.04, Table 2.1. 
7 R. p. BC-161. 
8 Idaho Code§§ 67-6501 et seq. 
RESPONDENT CITY OF BOISE'S BRIEF OPPOSING 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - 4 
000042
Ordinance ("Zoning Ordinance") allow this use to exceed the base zoning' s standard height limit 
of 3 5 feet with the issuance of a CUP. 9 
II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Does Petitioner have standing under Idaho Code § 67-6521 to seek 
judicial review of the City Council's approval of the River Edge CUP? 
2. Did Petitioner challenge the City Council's approval .of the River Edge 
CUP without a reasonable basis in fact or law thereby entitling 
Respondent to attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-11 7? 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review. 
LLUP A allows judicial review of a final decision of a land use application for an affected 
person, as provided in the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act (IAP A). 10, The issuance of 
special or conditional use permits is allowed by Idaho Code § 67-6512(a), and includes 
exceptions or waivers of standards for building height as addressed by Idaho Code § 67-6516. 11 
Therefore, a party aggrieved by a decision of the City Council approving a conditional use 
permit for a height exception may seek judicial review under the provisions of IAP A. 
9 Idaho Code§ 67-6512(£); Boise City Code§ 11-06-06.09. 
10 Idaho Code§ 67-6521(1)(d); In re Jerome County Bd. o/Com'rs, 281 P.3d 1076, _ (2012). 
11 Idaho Code§ 67-6512(£). 
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In its review, "The district court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to 
the weight of the evidence on questions of fact." 12 "[T]he agency's factual determinations are 
binding on the reviewing court, even where there is conflicting evidence before the agency, so 
long as the determinations are supported by substantial, competent evidence on the record."13 
Regarding the Court's scope of review, Idaho Code§ 67-5279(3) requires: 
When the agency was required by the provisions of this chapter or by oilier 
provisions of law to issue an order, the court shall affirm the agency action unless 
the court finds that the agency's findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions 
are: 
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; 
(b) in excess of statutory authority of the agency; 
( c) made upon unlawful procedure; 
( d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or 
( e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 
If the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole or in part, and 
remanded for further proceedings as necessary. 
I • 
"There is a strong presumption favoring the validity of a governing board's zoning decisions, 
including its application and interpretation of its own zoning ordinance."14 
B. Petitioner has not established it has standing to seek judicial review of the 
City Council's approval of the River Edge CUP, as required by Idaho Code § 
67-6521. 
A "fundamental tenet of American jurisprudence" is "that a person wishing to invoke a 
court's jurisdiction must have standing."15 In land use cases, LLUP A allows judicial review 
12 Cowan v. Bd O/Com'rs of Fremont Cnty., 143 Idaho 501,508, 148 P.3d 1247, 1254 (2006) (paraphrasing Idaho 
Code§ 67-5279(1)); See also, Marcia T. Turner, L.L.C. v. City of Twin Falls, 144 Idaho 203, 209, 159 P.3d 840, 
845 (2007). 
13 Fischerv. City of Ketchum, 141 Idaho 349,-352, 109 P.3d 1091, 1094 (2005) (quoting Price v. Payette County Bd. 
of County Com 'rs, 131 Idaho 426,429, 958 P.2d 583, 586 (1998)). . 
14 Marcia T. Turner, L.L.C. v. City of Twin Falls, 144 Idaho 203,209, 159 P.3d 840, 845 (2007). 
15 In re Jerome County Bd of Com 'rs, 281 P.3d 1076, (2012) (quoting Van Valkenburgh v. Citizens for Term 
. -
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pursuant to IAP A for "affected person[ s] aggrieved by a final decision" granting or denying a 
development permit after · exhausting all available remedies under local ordinances. 16 An 
"affected person" is "one having a bona fide interest in real property which may be adversely 
affected by: (i) [t]he approval, denial or failure to act upon an application for a subdivision, 
variance, special use permit and such other similar applications required or authorized pursuant 
to this chapter."17 Standing in this matter depends on whether Petitioner can show real or 
potential harm to Petitioner's property due to City Council's approval of the River Edge·CUP.18 
Despite all the cases Petitioner cites, 19 Petitioner has not met this burden and cannot be 
considered an affected party for purposes of judicial review by this Court. 
Petitioner cites numerous cases in an effort tor establish standing: Johnson v. Blaine 
County,20 where the harm was a higher density than the underlying zone allowed; Taylor v. 
Canyon County Bd of Com 'rs,21 where the harm was in living adjacent to a property being 
rezoned to a higher density; Cowan v. Board of Com 'rs of Fremont County, 22 where the harm 
was in living adjacent to a property being subdivided and developed; Davisco Foods Int 'l, Inc. v. 
Gooding County,23 where the harm could be the smell from development of a proposed 
Limits, 135 Idaho 121, 124, 15 P.3d 1129, 1132 (2000)). 
16 Idaho Code§ 67-6521(1)(d); see also, Hawkins v. Bonneville County Bd o/Com 'rs, 151 Idaho 228,231,254 P.3d 
1224, 1227 (2011). 
17 Idaho Code§ 67-6521(1)(a). 
18 Cowan v. Board of Com 'rs of Freemont County, 143 Idaho 501, 509, 148 P.3d 1247, 1255 (2006). 
19 Petitioner's Brief at 13-14. 
20 146 Idaho 916, 920, 204 P.3d 1127, 1131 (2009). 
21 147 Idaho 424,210 P.3d 532 (2009). 
22 143 Idaho 501,509, 148 P.3d 1247, 1255 (2006). 
23 141 Idaho 784, 787, 118 P.3d 116, 119 (2005). 
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wastewater treatment plant; and Evans v. Teton County,24 where the harm was in living adjacent 
to a property being rezoned to accommodate a resort development. To claim "affected person" 
status, Petitioner's only similarity with these cases is found with adjacency to the proposed 
development. But adjacency wasn't the key detail of the cases above. "Proximity is a very 
important factor," but standing status depends on being adversely affected - not being within a 
specified distance.25 . 
In the case at hand, Petitioner is a landowner adjacent26 to a 3.42 acre parcel zoned R-
OD27 which allows the multi ... family project the Intervenor seeks to build as an allowed use.28 
The Zoning Ordinance sets out the acceptable density for the subject parcel's R-OD zone29 - a 
density which Intervenor is not asking to exceed.30 The Zoning Ordinance also establishes 
standards which control how much on-site parking is required for that specific density in that 
zone - again, standards which are met by Intervenor.31 As such, it cannot be reasonably argued 
that density and parking standards are the source of harm to establish Petitioner's standing 
because, but for the height exception, Intervenor has a legal right to build River Edge without 
any statutory review by Respondent nor any input from Petitioner. Therefore, if real or potential 
harm to real estate interests are to be shown, as the case law requires, 32 then harm to Petitioner 
24 139 Idaho 71, 75, 73 P.3d 84, 88 (2003). 
2S Id. 
26 R. pp. BC 239-241. 
27 R. p. BC 195. 
28 Boise City Code§ 11-04-05.04, Table 2.1. 
29 Boise City Code§ 11-04-05.05, Table 2.2A. 
30 R. pp. BC 176-180. 
31 R. p. BC 196. 
32 Cowan v. Board of Com 'rs of Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501, 509, 148 P.3d 1247, 1255 (2006); Evans v. Teton 
County, 139 Idaho 71, 76, 73 P.3d 84, 89 (2003). 
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must surely originate from Intervenor's height exception- as it is the only part of the application 
that is not already outright allowed by the Zoning Ordinance. 
Petitioner's assertion of harm stemming from a height exception is imagined. For one, 
Petitioner does not assert a legal claim to a view easement which Intervenor's building will 
disrupt. Furthermore, despite so many pages of Petitioner's brief devoted to the topic, it does not 
follow that the heights of 59 and 61 feet requested from the Intervenor translate into the parking 
crisis Petitioner claims. There is no nexus or causal connection between the two elements and no 
parking problem proximately caused by wanting a taller building. For example, the extra height 
requested above the 35' which the R-OD zone allows by right could be merely aesthetic 
preference. Alternatively, the Intervenor could wish to have dwelling units with very tall 
ceilings or have extra sound-proofing between floors or have a decorative spire that serves no 
dwelling purpose whatsoever. Or, as is actually the case, the Intervenor could wish to build the 
project over a first floor devoted to parking such that there are no actual first floor dwelling 
units.33 
It is neither sensible nor logical to believe Petitioner's real property could be adversely 
affected by the River Edge height exception; height alone does not translate into a parking 
emergency, despite Petitioner's insistence to the contrary. By contrast, Landowner applicants 
"have a substantial right to develop their own property. "34 LLUP A gives the City Council the 
. authority to make decisions about CUPs for height exceptions. 35 Petitioner's desire for a 
33 R. p. BC 164. 
34 Hawkins v. Bonneville County Bd of Com 'rs, 151 Idaho 228, 233, 254 P.3d 1224, 1229 (2011). 
35 Idaho Code§ 67-6512. 
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different outcome in the matter does not equate to the adverse effect necessary for standing. For 
these reasons, Petitioner's standing to challenge the River Edge CUP decision is lacking and its 
appeal to this Court must be dismissed. 
C. Petitioner has not established that any substantial rights have been 
prejudiced. 
Even if this Court determines that Petitioner has standing to set this case in motion, Idaho Code 
§ 67-6535(3) directs that, "Only those whose challenge to a decision demonstrates actual harm or 
violation of fundamental rights, not the mere possibility thereof, shall be entitled to a remedy or 
reversal of a decision."36 The City Council's approval of the River Edge CUP must be affirmed 
unless "substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced."37 Mere conclusory allegations 
that property rights have been prejudiced are not sufficient to prove prejudice to substantial 
rights.38 
While the Petitioner must show both an error under the standard of review set forth in 
Idaho Code § 67-5279(3) and prejudice to substantial rights under Idaho Code § 67-5279(4), 
"nothing in the IAP A requires the courts to address these two requirements in any particular 
order."39 This Court can affirm the City Council's decision solely on the grounds that Petitioner 
has not shown prejudice to substantial rights. 40 And it may completely "forego analyzing 
36 Idaho Code§ 67-6535(3) (emphasis added). 
37 Idaho Code§ 67-5279(4). 
38 Krempaskyv. Nez Perce County Planning and Zoning, 150 Idaho 231,235,245 P.3d 983,987 (2010). 
39 Hawkins, 151 Idaho at 232 (2011). 
40 Id. 
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whether the governing board erred in a manner specified by Idaho Code. § 67-5279(3) if 
petitioner cannot show that his or her substantial rights were violated."41 
Petitioner asserts that its substantial rights were prejudiced because of procedural 
defects.42 Since Petitioner's brief fails to identify any procedural flaw in the City Council's 
approval of the River Edge CUP and makes no assertion of procedural error in the P &Z 
approval, it seems Petitioner's argument rests on a claim that the City Council violated its due 
. ~ 
process rights "by failing to adopt adequate findings of fact to show support for the conclusions 
of law the City is required to reach under City Code.',43 In this assertion, Petitioner relies on 
Hawkins v. Bonneville County Bd. of Com 'rs44 and Jasso v. Camas County45 to elevate 
displeasure in the outcome of the River Edge CUP into prejudice of a substantial right. But 
neither of these cases transforms non-applicant Petitioner's basic rights of due process and 
procedural fairness into substantial rights. 
Contrary to Petitioner's claims, Hawkins makes a clear distinction between the permit 
applicant and the non-applicant opponent on the subject of substantial rights, pointing out that 
the non-applicant opponent cannot claim harm to a substantial right merely in the substantive 
misapplication of an ordinance: 
41 Id. 
<. 
[W]hen a petitioner opposes a governing board's decision to grant a permit 
authorizing development, as Hawkins has, the petitioner must still show, not 
merely allege, real or potential prejudice to his or her substantial rights. Since a 
party opposing a landowner's request for a development permit has no substantial 
42 Petitioner's Brief at 24-26. 
43 Petitioner's Brief at 26. 
44 151 Idaho 228, 254 P.3d 1224 (2011). 
45 151 Idaho 790, 264P.3d 897 (2011). 
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right in seeing someone else's application adjudicated correctly, he or she must 
therefore show something more. The petitioner opposing a permit must be in 
jeopardy of suffering substantial harm if the project goes forward, such as a 
reduction in the opponent's land value or interference with his or her use or 
ownership of the land. It would be instructive to look to law relating to property 
rights, nuisance, and trespass when determining if a substantial right is at stake in 
a case such as this. 
Thus, ( . . . ) it is not enough that Hawkins may be able to show that the County 
substantively misapplied its own ordinance. The Board does not prejudice 
Hawkins' substantial rights merely by incorrectly adjudicating someone else's 
application for a variance. 46 · 
Petitioner, as the non-applicant opponent in the case at hand, cannot claim harm to a substantial 
right by asserting that the City failed to condition the River Edge CUP on Boise City Code § 11-
06-04.14. Hawkins is clear Petitioner has no such right to seeing Intervenor's CUP application 
adjudicated correctly.47 
Petitioner's reliance on Jasso v. Camas County48 is equally flawed. In Jasso, the Court 
found there was "utter failure" on the part of the Camas County Board of Commissioners to 
provide a decision that could facilitate judicial review.49 "Due to the inadequacy of the Board's 
.· findings and conclusions, neither the district court nor [the Idaho Supreme] Court p9ssesses the 
information necessary to meaningfully review the Board's approval of the preliminary plat 
46 Hawkins, 151 Idaho at 233 (internal citations omitted). 
47 Respondent asserts the P&Z was never required, by the plain laµguage of the ordinance, to condition the River 
Edge CUP on Boise City Code § 11-06-04.14. This is especially true in light of the parking standards set forth in 
Boise City Code§ 11-10-01.01, Table 1, which were applicable to and met by Intervenor. If the language of an 
ordinance is unambiguous (where reasonable minds do not differ nor are uncertain as to its meaning), an ordinance 
is given its plain meaning. See, Jasso v. Camas County, 151 Idaho 790,798,264 P.3d 897, 905 (2011). 
Had the P&Z been required to condition the CUP on Boise City Code§ 11-06-04.14, following Petitioner's logic, 
the CUP would have been required to have conditions related to, for example, noise and vibration (see, § 11-06-
04. l 4(D)) and hours ofoperation (see, § 11-06-04.14(E)). 
48 151 Idaho 790, 264 P3d 879 (2011). 
49 151 Idaho at 797. 
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application."50 The Court held in Jasso that, ''the Board's failure to provide a reasoned statement 
for its decision prejudiced [the parties'] substantial right to due process."51. 
It cannot be rationally argued that the City Council, after its review of the record and 
consideration of extensive testimony about parking standards and parking concerns, 52 failed to 
return adequate findings and conclusions or failed to provide a reasoned statement for its 
decision of April 17, 2012.53 At a minimum, the City Council could have simply adopted the 
P&Z :findings and conclusions54 because Idaho Code § 67-6535 requires only that findings and 
conclusions be made.55 However on April 24, 2012, the City ·council did formally adopt its 
Reason for Decision and Conditions of Approval clearly setting forth the elements considered, 
the facts measured as important, the Zoning Ordinance standards used and interpreted, and the 
site-specific conditions that were deemed necessary and appropriate for the River Edge CUP. 56 
Therefore, Petitioner's reliance on Jasso to claim prejudice to its substantial rights is erroneous. 
Petitioner has provided nothing more than conclusory allegations of prejudice to 
imagined substantial rights. As such, Petitioner has failed to meet its burden under Idaho Code § 
67-5279(4) and, regardless of any other facts argued, this Court can affirm the City Council's 
decision and dismiss the Petitioner's appeal instantly. 57 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 R. pp. BC 121-122, 114-115, 125; Tr. Boise City Council Meeting (April 17, 2012) pp. 6-11, 17-19,21-23, 25, 
27, 29-34. 
53 See, City Council's Reason for Decision and Conditions of Approval, formally adopted April 24, 2012 at R. pp. 
BC 284-287. 
54 R. pp. BC 108-111. 
55 Cowan v. Board ofCom'rs of Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501,511, 148 P. 3d 1247, 1257 (2006). 
56 R. pp. BC 284-287. 
57 See, Hawkins, 151 Idaho at 232. 
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D. The City Council did not err in a manner specified in Idaho Code § 67-
5279(3) when it approved the River Edge CUP for a height exception. 
Because of Respondent and Intervenor's indistinguishable interests in this case, and in 
the interests of brevity and ease of this Court's review, Respondent hereby concurs with and 
adopts the arguments proffered by the Intervenor concerning the standards of Idaho Code § 67-
5279(3) and Petitioner's failure to demonstrate error by the City Council. These arguments are 
set out in Intervenor's Brief on pages 10-19, and Respondent adopts them in whole and with 
minor additions, as follows. 
In this appeal, except for the significant financial interests Intervenor alone has in the 
matter, the Respondent and Intervenor possess identical interests in seeing the City Council's 
decision of April 17, 2012, upheld. Petitioner's failure to address the applicable standards of 
Idaho Code § 67-5279(3), coupled with Petitioner's assertion of irrelevant58 or simply 
unaddressed59 issues on appeal, left the Respondent and Intervenor wondering how best to relate 
Petitioner's arguments to Idaho Code§ 67-5279(3) so that the Court is not also equally confused. 
Additionally, Petitioner's failure to address the applicable Zoning Ordinance sections of§ 1 l-06-
04.13(C) and§ 11-10-01.01, Table 1,60 was mystifying to both Respondent and Intervenor. 
58 Petitioner's arguments regarding the 1997 Boise City Comprehensive Plan and its inc01poration of the Downtown 
Plan (Petitioner's Brief at 9-11) is perplexing since this legislative history is irrelevant to the City Council's 
interpretation of its ordinances. Furthermore, Petitioner's second Issue on Appeal (Petitioner's Brief at 7) asserts 
that the P&Z decision, and the City Council's refusal to overturn it, was made upon unlawful procedure. However, 
Petitioner never alleges procedural error by the City Council, only disagreement with the City's interpretation of its 
Zoning Ordinance. The P&Z decision is not subject to judicial review as it is not a final decision, pursuant to Idaho 
Code§ 67-6521(d). 
59 See, Petitioner's first Issue on Appeal (Petitioner's Brief at 7) regarding the P&Z decision and City Council's 
refusal to overturn that decision as being in excess of the City Code's authority. 
60 Boise City Code § 11-06-04.13(C) is the one of seven CUP standards which addresses parking: "That the site is 
large enough to accommodate the proposed use and 'all yards, open spaces, pathways, walls and fences. parking, 
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In summary, the record before this Court is replete with substantial evidence of the City 
Council's coming to a reasoned decision61 that this Court cannot now second guess. Upon 
review, "[t]he district court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight 
of~e evidence on questions offact."62 
The City Council's performance of its duty as a quasi-judicial agency - by considering 
how specific facts align with the standards o{ the Zoning Ordinance - is now "binding on the 
reviewing court," even if there was conflicting evidence before the agency63 so long as the 
determinations are supported by substantial and competent evidence. 64 Substantial and 
competent evidence is "relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept to support a 
conclusion. "65 
In addition to the burden of establishing both standing and prejudice to substantial rights, 
I 
Petitioner has the burden of proving that the City Council erred in at least one of the standards of 
review set out in Idaho Code § 67-5279(3). As noted above, "There is a strong presumption 
favoring the validity of a governing board's zoning decisions, including its application and 
interpretation of its own zoning ordinance. "66 The P &Z ~as not required to adopt the specific 
loading, landscaping and such other features as are required by this title." (emphasis added). Boise Cify Code§ 11-
10-01.01, Table 1, sets forth the amount of parking "required by this title": 1.5 spaces per dwelling unit plus 1 guest 
space per 10 units. 
61 Tr. Boise City Council Meeting (April 17, 2012) pp. 34-40. 
62 Cowan v. Bd. Of Com 'rs of Fremont Cnty., 143 Idaho 501, 508, 148 P.3d 1247, 1254 (2006) (paraphrasing Idaho 
Code § 67-5279(1)); See also, Marcia T. Turner, L.L.C. v. City of Twin Falls, 144 Idaho 203, 209, 159 P.3d 840, 
845 (2007). 
63 See, Fischer v. City of Ketchum, 141 Idaho 349, 352, 109 P .3d 1091, 1094 (2005). 
64 Wohrle v. Kootenai County, 147 Idaho 267,274,207 P.3d 998, 1005 (2009). 
65 Wohrle, 147 Idaho at274 (quoting Lamar Corp. v. City of Twin Falls, 133 Idaho 36, 43,981 P.2d 1146, 1153 
u999)). . 
Marcia T. Turner, L.L.C. v. City of Twin Falls, 144 Idaho 203,209, 159 P.3d 840,845 (2007). 
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findings and conclusions addressing the Zoning Ordinance CUP standards.67 The City could rely 
on the parking standards set out in its own Zoning Ordinance to decide the River Edge CUP for a 
height exception was appropriate and well-supported by the evidence. For these reasons, 
Petitioner's claims must fail. 
E. Petitioner is not entitled to attorney's fees. 
Petitioner's request for attorney's fees was not properly pied in its Issues on Appeal68 and, 
therefore, should be denied. Idaho Appellate Rule 41(a) requires that, "Any party seeking 
attorney fees on appeal must assert such a claim as an issue presented on appeai in the first 
appellate brief filed by such party as provided by Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a)(5) and 35(b)(5)."69 
Appellant (Petitioner) is obligated to "indicate in the division of issues on appeal that appellant is 
claiming attorney fees and state the basis for the claim."70 Idaho Appellate Rule 35(b)(5) 
requires the same formality of pleadings by the Respondent and, as such, has been set forth as an 
Addition Issue Presented on Appeal, above. 
Even if this Court determines the pleadings were adequate, Petitioner's demand for fees 
is not warranted. Attorney's fees can only be awarded under Idaho Code § 12-117 if: 1.) the 
Court finds in favor of a party, and 2.) the other party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or 
law.71 According to the Idaho Supreme Court, it is necessary "to determine whether there was 
67 Petitioner asserts numerous times that the P&Z and City Council were required to address each of the conditions 
set forth in Boise City Code § 11-06-04.14. This assertion is not supported by law and is contrary to the plain 
language of the ordinance. See Footnote 47. 
68 Petitioner's Brief at 7. 
69 IAR 41(a)(emphasis added). 
70 IAR 35(a)(5)(emphasis added). 
71 Burns Holdings, LLC v. Madison County Bd o/County Com 'rs, 147 Idaho 660,664,214 P.3d 646, 650 (2009). 
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no authority at all for the agency's actions."72 If an agency has no authority to take a particular 
action, it is said to act without a reasonable basis in fact or law.73 For the reasons argued herein, 
the City Council was not acting outside the scope of its authority when it denied the Petitioner's 
appeal and affirmed the P &Z approval of the River Edge CUP. LLUP A empowers the City 
Council to take the action it took. Therefore, Petitioner should not be awarded attorney's fees in 
this matter. 
F. Respondent is entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-117 
because Petitioner challenged the City Council's approval of River Edge 
CUP without any reasonable basis in fact or law. 
The arguments presented herein and within the Intervenor's Brief establish that 
Respondent is entitled to attorney's fees awarded by this Court. There is no basis in law for 
Petitioner's continued insistence74 that the P&Z was required to make its River Edge CUP 
approval contingent upon the specified conditions set out in Boise City Code § 11-06.:.04.14. 
And the absurdity of that insistence is borne out in the way that some of the conditions of Boise 
City Code § 11-06-04.14 are outright inapplicable to the River Edge CUP. Following 
·Petitioner's logic, the P&Z would have been required to add conditions related to, for example, 
' . 
noise and vibration 75 and hours of operation. 76 
72 Wohrle v. 'Kootenai County, 147 Idaho 267,276,207 P.3d 998, 1007 (2009) (quoting Ralph Naylor.Farms, LLCv. 
Latah County, 114 Idaho 806,809, 172 P.3d 1081, 1084 (2007)). 
13 Fischer v. City of Ketchum, 141 Idaho 349,356, 109 P.3d 1091, 1098 (2005). 
74 Petitioner's Brief at 5, 8, 16, 18-21, 24. 
75 Boise City Code§ 11-06-04.14(1)). 
76 Boise City Code§ l 1-06-04.14(E). 
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/ 
Petitioner has failed to provide any reasonable argument for this Court to overturn the 
City Council's decision under the applicable standards of review in Idaho Code § 67-5279(3). 
The City Council has properly decided that the River Edge CUP approval was appropriate based 
on the Zoning Ordinance and extensive testimony in the record and that the P &Z decision was in 
no, way erroneous. This Court, in turn, should do the same because of Petitioner's failures as 
outlined and the Court's deference to the City Council's interpretation of its laws.77 
"The purpose of Idaho Code § 12-117 is to serve as a deterrent to groundless or arbitrary 
, action and to provide a remedy for persons who have borne unfair and unjustified financial 
burdens defending against groundless charges or attempting to correct mistakes agencies should 
never have made."78 Accordingly, Respondent is entitled to be reimbursed for its reasonable 
attorney's fees incurred in this appeal pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-117. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Petitioner's appeal should be denied, and the decision _by the Boise City Council to 
uphold the decision of the Planning and Zoning Commission should be upheld. The Petitioner 
has failed to prove requisite standing and has failed to prove that any of its substantial rights 
have been prejudiced in accordance with Idaho Code § 67-5279(4). In accordance with Idaho 
Code § 67-5279(3), the Petitioner has not established that the City's action: violated 
constitut~onal or statutory provisions; exceeded its statutory authority; was made upon unlawful 
77 See, Marcia T. Turner, LLC v. City of Twin Falls, 144 Idaho 203,209, 159 P.3d 840, 845 (2007). 
18 Neighbors fora Healthy Gold Forkv. Valley County, 145 Idaho 121, 143, 176 P.3d 126, 138 (2007). 
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procedure; was not suppo~ed by substantial evidence; or was arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of 
discretion. As such, the Respondent respectfully requests this Court affirm City Council's 
decision and deny the Petitioner's appeal. 
In addition, the Respondent requests an order granting it reasonable attorney fees against 
Petitioner pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-117 as there was no reasonable basis in fact or law to 
support the Petitioner's appeal. 
DATED this 30th day of August, 2012. 
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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Intervenor Royal Boulevard Associates, LP ("Intervenor") plans to build a multi-family 
apartment complex called the River Edge Apartments ("River Edge") along the Boise River near 
Boise State University ("BSU") and downtown Boise.1 Multi-family housing is a permitted use 
for this location under the Boise City Zoning Ordinance ("BCZO"). 2 The requested height for 
River Edge is allowed upon Boise City's approval of a conditional use permit ("CUP") pursuant 
to BCZO § 11-06-04 ("CUP Ordinance"), BCZO § 11-06-06.09 (allowing height exceptions by 
CUP), and its enabling legislation, Idaho Code § 67-6512 within the Local Land Use Planning 
Act, Idaho Code§§ 67-6501 et seq. ("LLUPA"). 
The Boise City Planning and Zoning Commission ("P&Z") approved a CUP for a height 
exception for River Edge on March 5, 2012. An adjacent property owner, 917 Lusk, LLC 
("Petitioner"), appealed the P&Z's decision to the Boise City Council ("City Council"), 
complaining that River Edge would obscure the view of Ann Morrison Park from Petitioner's 
office building3 and arguing that the P&Z's decision did not satisfy certain CUP criteria.4 On 
April 17, 2012, the City Council upheld the P&Z decision based on the BCZO and the record of 
the P&Z proceedings.5 On May 17, 2012, Petitioner filed this judicial review action challenging 
the City Council's decision. 
2 
3 
4 
5 
P&Z Action Letter (3-6-12) ("Decision Letter''), pp. 1-6, BC pp. 106-111. 
BCZO §§ 11-04-05.03 and 11-04-05.04. 
Petitioner's Appeal Letter, p. 3, BC p. 83. 
Petitioner's Appeal Letter, pp. 2-9, BC pp. 82 to 89. 
City Council Decision Statement, BC pp. 284-287. 
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II. ADDITIONAL ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did Petitioner challenge the City Council's approval of Intervenor's CUP for 
River Edge without any reasonable basis in fact or law thus entitling 
Intervenor to attorneys' fees pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-117? 
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Intervenor is part of a family of companies known as the Michaels Organization 
("Michaels"), which is one of the nation's largest affordable housing developers.6 River Edge is 
intended primarily as housing for BSU students.7 The project is ideally located for this purpose 
in easy walking or biking distance of the BSU campus, next to the Boise River.8 
Michaels applied to the City for a CUP for a height exception on November 28, 2011. 
After an initial delay, the matter was set for hearing on February 6, 2012, where the CUP was 
approved.9 However, two persons associated with Petitioner had left the hearing room and failed 
to return to testify. 10 To ensure the City received their testimony, at a hearing on February 13, 
2012, the City rescinded the approval and continued the hearing until March 5, 2012. 11 
At the March 5th hearing, City staff informed the P&Z and the audience of the City staffs 
and City attorney's interpretation of the City's ordinances. 12 In so many words, the staff stated 
that the multi-family use meets the City's parking ordinance in Title 11, Chapter 10 of the City 
Code (the "Parking Ordinance"), and that the additional parking issues are not before the P&Z as 
6 Affidavit of Joseph Coyle in Support of Motion to Intervene, p. 2, par. 3. 
7 Decision Letter, p. 3, BC p. 108; City Council Decision Statement, BC p. 284; Staff Report (2-6-12), p. 5, 
in Staff Packet (3-5-12), p. 65, BC p. 198; Applicant Letter (11-28-11), p. 1, BC p. 181; Applicant Letter (2-27-12), 
p. 1, BC p. 176. 
Decision Letter, p. 3, BC p. 108; City Council Decision Statement, BC p. 284; Staff Report (2-6-12), p. 5, 
in Staff Packet (3-5-12), p. 65, BC p. 198. 
9 
JO 
Boise City Planning and Development Services Memorandum (3-5-12), p. 1, BC 134. 
Boise City Planning and Development Services Memorandum (3-5-12), p. 1, BC 134. 
11 Boise City Planning and Development Services Memorandum (3-5-12), p. 1, BC 134; P&Z Hearing 
Minutes (2-13-12), p. 4, BC p. 226. 
12 Staff testimony, P&Z Hearing Minutes (3-5-12) p. 1, BC p. 112 
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part of the height CUP .13 The P &Z followed the advice of staff and based its determin~tion of 
parking requirements on the standards in the Parking Ordinance.14 Nonetheless, Petitioner and 
other parties submitted extensive testimony about parking at the P&Z hearing. 15 
Petitioner th~n appealed to the City Council, which held a hearing on April 17, 2012. 16 
Once again, Petitioner and persons supporting Petitioner spoke at length about their parking 
concems. 17 City Council members discussed the concerns raised by Petitioner in some detail, 
ultimately rejecting them.18 The City Council's decision affirms the P&Z's decision based in 
part on the City Council's interpretation that the standards in the Parking Ordinance control the 
parking requirements for a height exception CUP .19 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Introduction. 
Petitioner has the burden to establish (i) that when the City Council affirmed the P&Z's 
approval of the CUP the City Council erred in at least one of the standards of review specified in 
Idaho Code § 67-5279(3),20 and (ii) that Petitioner's substantial rights have been prejudiced in 
accordance with Idaho Code§ 67-5279(4).21 Petitioner has not met either burden. 
13 P&Z Hearing Minutes (3-5-12) pp. 1, 15, BC pp. 112, 126; Boise City Planning and Development Services 
Memorandum (3-5-12), p. 2, BC 135. 
14 P&Z Hearing Minutes (3-5-12), pp. 15, BC pp. 126. 
15 Petitioner testimony, P&Z Hearing Minutes (3-5-12), pp. 9-11, BC pp. 120-122; Public testimony, P&Z 
Hearing Minutes (3-5-12), p. 13, BC p. 124. 
16 Application for Appeal, BC p. 80; Petitioner's Appeal Letter (3-29-12), pp. 1-15, BC pp. 81-95; City 
Council Meeting Minutes (4-17-12), p. 20, BC 51; City Council Hearing Minutes (4-17-12) p. 1-40; City Council 
Decision Statement, BC p. 284. 
17 City Council Meeting Minutes (4-17-12), pp. 6, 9-10, 27, 29-31, 33-34. 
18 
19 
20 
City Council Meeting Minutes (4-17-12), pp. 34-40. 
City Council Meeting Minutes (4-17-12), pp. 35-38; City Council Decision Statement, BC p. 284. 
Idaho Code§ 67-5279(3) provides: 
When the agency was required by the provisions of this chapter or by other provisions of 
law to issue an order, the court shall affmn the agency action unless the court finds that 
the agency's findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: 
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; 
INTERVENOR ROY AL BOULEY ARD ASSOCIATES LP'S RESPONSE BRIEF - 3 
000066
Petitioner's Brief fails to focus on the pertinent law, which has made it difficult to write a 
responding brief. Petitioner's arguments boil down to questioning whether the City may 
interpret its ordinances to limit parking-related conditions that may be attached to a height 
exception CUP to those standards set forth in the Parking Ordinance. Yet, Petitioner fails to 
wrestle with the two provisions in the BCZO that control how much parking is required for a 
height exception CUP: (1) BCZO § 11-06-04.13(C) in the CUP Ordinance and (2) BCZO § 11-
10-01.01 (Table 1) in the Parking Ordinance. BCZO § 11-06-04.13 provides that the P&Z "may 
approve a conditional use permit when the evidence presented at the hearing is such to 
establish ... [seven standards]."22 Only one of these seven standards addresses parking: BCZO § 
11-06-04.13(C), which provides: 
That the site is large enough to accommodate the proposed use and 
all yards, open spaces, pathways, walls and fences, parking, 
loading, landscaping and such other features as are required by this 
title. 
(emphasis added.) The parking "required by this title" for the proposed use is set forth in BCZO 
§ 11-10-01.01 (Table 1), which requires 1.5 spaces per dwelling unit plus 1 guest space per 10 
units. The undisputed evidence in the record shows that River Edge meets this parking standard 
by providing 280 on-site parking spaces for 175 units.23 With no basis in law, Petitioner tries to 
21 
22 
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; 
( c) made upon unlawful procedure; 
( d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or 
( e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 
If the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole or in part, and 
remanded for further proceedings as necessary. 
Friends of Farm to Market v. Valley County, 137 Idaho 192, 196, 46 P.3d 9, 13 (2002). 
BCZO § 11-06-04.13 (emphasis added). 
23 Staff Report (2-6-12), pp. 3-5, in Staff Packet (3-5-12), pp. 63-65, BC pp. 196-198; Applicant Letter (2-27-
12), p. 1, BC 176; Applicant Letter (11-28-11), p. 1, BC p. 181; Applicant testimony, P&Z Hearing Minutes (3-5-
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sidestep these controlling ordinance provisions and recast the parking discussion largely as a 
matter of procedural error or lack of substantial evidence. 
Petitioner's Brief also fails to address the applicable bases for overturning a City Council 
decision under Idaho Code § 67-5279(3), leaving the parties and the Court to try to relate 
Petitioner's arguments to the applicable standards (which the following sections of this brief 
attempt to do). For example, Petitioner states in its first "Issue on Appeal" that the P&Z's 
decision and City's Council's refusal to overturn that decision was in excess of the City's 
authority.· Petitioner's Brief at 7. However, no portion of the Argument in Petitioner's Brief 
appears to address this issue. Further, the P&Z's action was not a "decision" on which "all 
remedies have been exhausted under local ordinances" that is subject to judicial review.24 Only 
the City Council's decision meets this definition. 
Similarly, Petitioner states in its second "Issue on Appeal" that the P&Z's decision and 
City's Council's refusal to overturn that decision was made upon unlawful procedure.25 
However, Petitioner never alleges any procedural error by the City Council. Petitioner argues at 
page 17 of its Brief that the P&Z did not follow the BCZO's "conditional use procedure" by 
declining to deliberate on testimony about parking and instead relying only on the Parking 
Ordinance. However, this is not a procedural error at all, but simply Petitioner's disagreement 
with how the City interpreted its ordinances. Even if this were a legitimate procedural error, 
12), p. 3, BC p. 114. Further, Petitioner's Brief does not allege any deficiency with meeting this CUP standard and 
Petitioner did not allege any deficiencies with meeting this CUP standard in its appeal to City Council. 
24 Idaho Code§ 67-6521(d). 
25 Petitioner's Brief at 7. 
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which it is not,26 the P&Z's decision is not subject to judicial review and the City Council 
considered the testimony in the record appropriately. 
Throughout its Brief, Petitioner appears to assume without authority that the City was 
required to consider the imposition of parking standards beyond the Parking Ordinance as part of 
considering the CUP standards of compatibility or no adverse impact on other properties. Yet 
Petitioner fails to provide any argument why the plain language of the CUP Ordinance and the 
Parking Ordinance allow such an interpretation, and Petitioner fails to address why the City's 
interpretation was "capricious, arbitrary, or unreasonable,"27 thus overcoming the "strong 
presumption of validity" of the City's interpretation.28 
Petitioner clearly wishes the City had interpreted its ordinances differently. However, 
Petitioner~s desire for a different outcome does not give rise to a legal error or create prejudice to 
Petitioner's substantial rights. Nor does Petitioner's desire for a different outcome entitle 
Petitioner to file a Petition for Judicial Review without a reasonable basis in law or fact. 
Petitioner fails to cite controlling legal authority (particularly the standards that govern 
interpretation of the Parking and CUP Ordinances) and to provide sufficient argument to support 
its claim that this Court must overturn the City's Council's decision. Petitioner has caused 
unnecessary delay to the project and unnecessary expense to the City and Intervenor to respond 
to the Petition. For the reasons described herein, Intervenor asks the Court to uphold the City 
Council's decision and to order Petitioner to pay Intervenor's attorneys' fees. 
26 As explained below, the P&Z followed all notice and hearing procedures for a CUP. Petitioner's 
disagreement with the P&Z's interpretation of its ordinances as to applicable parking standards does not amount to a 
procedural error, and, moreover, the P&Z properly applied the parking standards in the CUP Ordinance. 
27 Lane Ranch Partnership v. City of Sun Valley ("Lane Ranch"), 145 Idaho 87, 91, 175 P.3d 776, 780 (2007) 
(citing Enterprise, Inc. v. Nampa City, 96 Idaho 734,739,536 P.2d 729, 734 (1975). 
28 In re Jerome County Bd. Of Comm 'rs, 281 P.3d 1076 (Idaho 2012); Krempasky v. Nez Perce County 
Planning and Zoning, 150 Idaho 231, 235, 245 P.3d 983, 987 (2010); See also, Noble v. Kootenai County ex rel. 
Kootenai County Bd. ofComm'rs, 148 Idaho 937,940,231 P.3d 1034, 1037 (2010). 
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B. The City Council did not err in a manner specified in Idaho Code § 67-
5279(3). . . . . 
Petitioner's prayer for relief must fail because it has not demonstrated the City Council 
erred in a manner specified in Idaho Code § 67-5279(3), which provides the following standard 
of review applicable to this action: 
When the agency was required by the provisions of this chapter or by 
other provisions of law to issue an order, the court shall affirm the agency 
action unless the court finds that the agency's findings, inferences, 
conclusions, or decisions are: 
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; 
(1;>) in excess of the statutQry authority of the agency; 
( c) made upon unlawful procedure; 
( d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a 
whole; or 
(e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 
If the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole or in 
part, and remanded for further proceedings as necessary. 
(Emphasis added). Because Petitioner has not established that the City Council has violated any 
of the enumerated bases of error, the Court must uphold the City Council's approval of the 
CUP.29 
1. The City Council's approval of the CUP was not in violation of constitutional 
or statutory provisions (Idaho Code§ 67-5279(3)(a)). 
Petitioner does not raise in its Issues on Appeal that the City Council's decision violated 
constitutional or statutory provisions. 30 Thus, Petitioner cannot demonstrate any violation on this 
basis and is now precluded from raising this issue in this appeal. The Idaho Supreme Court 
refuses to consider "arguments raised for the first time in the appellant's reply brief."31 Instead, 
"[a] reviewing court looks only to the initial brief on appeal for the issues presented because 
29 See, e.g., Spencer v. Kootenai County, 145 Idaho 448, 452, 180 P.3d 487, 491 (2008); Fischer v. City of 
Ketchum, 141 Idaho 349,352, 109 P.3d 1091, 1094 (2005); Chisholm v. Twin Falls County, 139 Idaho 131, 134, 75 
P.3d 185, 188 (2003). 
30 See Issues on Appeal, Petitioner's Brief at 7 . 
• 31 Marcia T. Turner, L.L.C. v. City o/Twin Falls, 144 Idaho 203,211, 159 P.3d 840 (2007). 
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those are the arguments and authority to which the respondent has an opportunity to respond in 
the respondent's brief."32 
Without reference to either Idaho Code § 67-5279(3)(a), the Idaho Constitution, or other 
controlling legal authority, Petitioner generally asserts that the P&Z's "Reason for the Decision" 
violated Petitioner's due process rights because the P&Z "refused to resolve factual disputes in 
the conditional use procedure"33 and because the P&Z failed to adopt findings of fact addressing 
the standards in the CUP Ordinance.34 Even if this issue had been properly presented to this 
Court, Petitidner's broad assertions regarding the P&Z's actions do not provide a basis under 
Idaho Code § 67-5279(3)(a) for this Court to find that the City Council's approval of the CUP 
was made in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions. Moreover, Petitioner's general 
assertions are incorrect. 
When considering a CUP request, the P&Z is not required to resolve every factual 
dispute or even to consider every fact presented in testimony, especially when it deems that 
testimony irrelevant in light of specific, applicable standards set forth in the BCZO. Rather, the 
P&Z is required to issue its decision in writing, along with a reasoned statement that explains the 
relevant facts and law.35 And, the "court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency 
as to the weight of evidence on questions of fact."36 As affirmed by the City Council on appeal, 
the P&Z properly relied on the standards in the BCZO to approve the CUP. 
32 
33 
Id. 
Petitioner's Brief at 24. 
34 Petitioner's Brief at 26 (Petitioner argues: "The City violated Petitioner's due process rights by failing to 
adopt adequate findings of fact to show support for the conclusions of law the City is required to reach under City 
Code. BCC § 11-06-04.13; see also BCC § 11-06-04-14. The City specifically did not address the conditional use 
criteria established in City Code. The failure to adopt such findings and conclusions, alone, is sufficient to prejudice 
a substantial right of Petitioners.") 
35 Idaho Code§ 67-6535(2). 
36 Idaho Code§ 67-5279(1). 
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Additionally, contrary to Petitioner's assertion, the P&Z is not required to adopt specific 
findings and conclusions addressing each standard in the CUP Ordinance. The Idaho Code has 
not required a P&Z decision document to be in the form of findings of fact and conclusions of 
law since the Legislature amended LLUP A in 1999 to remove this requirement. Instead, as 
noted, LLUP A requires a decision to "be in writing and accompanied by a reasoned statement" 
that explains the rationale for the decision based on the relevant law and facts. 37 Both the City 
Council and the P&Z adopted such a reasoned statement.38 Thus, Petitioner's vague claims of 
due process violations are unfounded. 
Petitioner argues at pages 23 through 24 of its Brief that the P&Z's Reason for the 
Decision fails to meet Idaho Code§ 67-6535(2), which provides: 
The approval or denial of any application required or authorized 
pursuant to this chapter shall be in writing and accompanied by a 
reasoned statement that explains the criteria and standards 
considered relevant, states the relevant contested facts relied upon, 
and explains the rationale for the decision based on the applicable 
provisions of the comprehensive plan, relevant ordinance and 
statutory provisions, pertinent constitutional principles and factual 
information contained in the record. 
(Emphasis added.) The P &Z adopted a reasoned statement that meets this standard. 39 It sets 
forth the rationale for the decision based on what it believes to be the relevant law and facts, as 
required by Idaho Code § 67-6535. The Idaho Supreme Court will uphold such a statement 
when the decisionmaking body includes "the criteria and standards it considered relevant.. .. "40 
Specifically, as to parking, the decision statement concludes that the requested additional height 
37 
38 
39 
40 
Idaho Code§ 67-6535(b); Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71, 80-81 (2003). 
Decision Letter, pp. 1-6, BC pp. 106-111; City Council Decision Statement, BC pp. 284-287. 
Decision Letter, pp. 1-6. 3, BC p. 108-111. 
Cowan v. Board of Comm 'rs of Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501, 512, 148 P.3d 1274, 1258 (2006). 
Further, the Idaho Supreme Court has explained, "what is needed for adequate judicial review is a clear statement of 
what, specifically, the decisionmaking body believes, after hearing and considering all of the evidence, to be the 
relevant and important facts upon which its decision is based." Id. at 511, 1257. (emphasis added). 
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will not cause the building to exceed applicable parking standards and thus will not adversely 
affect surrounding properties.41 Likewise, the City Council appropriately approved this decision 
statement, as modified to require additional bike parking. 
Petitioner has not established, or even properly asserted, that the City Council's approval 
of the CUP violates any constitutional or statutory provisions. 42 
2. The City Council's approval of the CUP was not in excess of its statutory 
authority (Idaho Code§ 67-5279(3)(b)). 
Petitioner fails to demonstrate or even address how the City Council's decision is in 
excess of its statutory authority. On page 16 of its Brief, Petitioner cites to general standards 
applicable to the P&Z's treatment of CUP requests, including: 
• The requirement for a public hearing; 
• The requirement for the P &Z to determine whether or not the use would cause any 
damage, hazard, nuisance, or other detriment to persons or property in the vicinity; 
and 
• The requirement for the P &Z to approve, deny or modify the application and to 
impose any necessary conditions. 
However, Petitioner's Brief does not demonstrate, or even allege, that these general requirements 
were not met. Likewise, Petitioner did not raise this argument in its appeal to City Council. 
In fact, the P&Z held a public hearing at which Petitioner, its counsel and its supporters 
testified in person and/or in writing. The P&Z considered adverse impacts on surrounding 
properties, and made a decision on the application with conditions the City deemed necessary to 
allow the requested height exception.43 The City Council considered Petitioner's appeal in 
41 Decision Letter, p. 3, ~C p. 108. 
42 Petitioner states on page 15 of its Brief that a CUP may not be granted without compliance with Idaho 
Code§ 67-6512(a). This is not accurate, as this section ofLLUPA is an enabling statute that is only relevant to the 
validity of the City's ordinance. LLUP A sets forth the terms that must be included in the City's ordinance and then 
the City's ordinance controls. Petitioner is not challenging the validity of the City's ordinance and has not raised 
any specific arguments that the City's decision did not comply with Section 67-6512(a). 
43 P&Z Hearing Minutes (3-5-12), pp. 1-17, BC pp. 112-128; Decision Letter, pp. 1-6, BC pp. 106-111. 
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accordance with the hearing procedures and standards set forth in the BCZ044 and found no error 
with the P&Z's decision.45 Thus, the P&Z and City Council acted within their statutory 
authority. 
3. The City Council's approval of the CUP was not made upon unlawful 
procedure (Idaho Code§ 67-5279(3)(c)). 
Petitioner's Brief does not cite a single procedural violation by the City. In fact, the P&Z 
provided proper notice, held a public hearing ( and even provided an additional public hearing to 
accommodate Petitioner, who left the hearing room and missed the opportunity to testify at the 
first hearing), recorded the hearing, and issued a written decision in the required format.46 
Petitioner also did not allege specific procedural violations in its City Council appeal, and, 
regardless, the City Council found no procedural error in the P&Z's approval. Petitioner, its 
counsel and supporter participated extensively throughout both the P&Z and City Council 
proceedings. 
Throughout its brief, Petitioner attempts to recast the fact that the City interpreted its 
ordinances not to allow the imposition of parking conditions beyond those in the Parking 
Ordinance as "procedural errors" for failing to consider Petitioner's testimony or failing to 
follow CUP procedures.47 These arguments are without merit. Petitioner's disagreements with 
I 
the City's interpretation of its ordinances and with the City's substantive decision do not 
constitute procedural errors. 
44 
45 
46 
BCZO § 11-03-07.05. 
City Council Meeting Minutes (4-17-12), pp, 34-40; City Council Decision Statement, BC pp. 284-287. 
Decision Letter, pp. 1-6, BC pp. 106-111. 
47 Petitioner claims the P&Z did not take a "rigorous look" at the potential adverse impacts of the requested 
CUP on surrounding properties but instead "made the conclusory statement that there was adequate parking." 
Petitioner's Brief at 19. There is no legal standard requiring a "rigorous" look, but nonetheless, the P&Z decision 
demonstrates that the P&Z did consider the potential adverse impacts of the requested P&Z on surrounding 
properties. Decision Letter, p. 3, BC p. 108. Further, as to parking, the P&Z appropriately applied the standard set 
forth in the Parking Ordinance and concluded, based on the undisputed evidence in the record, that the standard was 
met. 
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Petitioner has not established that the City Council's approval of the CUP was made upon 
unlawful procedure. 
4. The City Council's approval of the CUP is supported by substantial evidence 
in the record as a whole (Idaho Code§ 67-5279(3)(d)). 
Petitioner fails to demonstrate how the P&Z's decision, upheld by the City Council, was 
not supported by substantial evidence in the record. For the CUP approval as a whole, and for 
each CUP standard, the record is ample. 
The following summary of record support relates to those CUP standards challenged by 
Petitioner in its City Council appeal48 and in Petitioner's Brief.49 
48 
a. Compatibility to other uses in the general neighborhood. 
• There are numerous buildings of similar height in the immediate vicinity, including 
Petitioner's own building next door that also received a height exception.50 
• River Edge provides ample separation from shorter structures. 51 
• The additional height does not increase the density to the point it exceeds the parking 
standards in the BCZO.52 
• The additional height will not create privacy concerns given that adjacent uses consist 
of offices and park land. 53 
• The additional height allows podium parking which creates a desirable aesthetic for 
the neighborhood; it minimizes surface parking, creates a better streetscape, and 
creates a more pedestrian friendly environment. 54 
"[I]ssues not raised below but raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered or reviewed." 
Whitted v. Canyon County Board of Comm 'rs, 137 Idaho 118, 122, 44 P.3d 1173, 1177 (2002). 
49 
"A reviewing court looks only to the initial brief on appeal for the issues presented because those are the 
arguments and authority to which the respondent has an opportunity to respond in the respondent's brief." Marcia 
T. Turner, L.L.C. v. City of Twin Falls, 144 Idaho 203,211, 159 P.3d 840 (2007). 
50 Decision Letter, p. 3, BC p. 108; Staff Report (3-5-12), pp. 2-3, in Staff Packet (3-5-12), pp. 2-3, BC pp. 
135-136; Staff Report (2-6-12), pp. 6-8, in Staff Packet (3-5-12), pp. 66-68, BC pp. 199-201; Applicant testimony, 
P&Z Hearing Minutes (3-5-12), p. 5, BC p. 116; Staff testimony, P&Z Hearing Minutes (3-5-12), p. 1, BC p. 112. 
51 
52 
53 
54 
Decision Letter, p. 3, BC p. 108; Staff Report (2-6-12), p. 6, in Staff Packet (3-5-12), p. 66, BC p. 199. 
Decision Letter, p. 3, BC p. 108; Staff Report (2-6-12), p. 8, in Staff Packet (3-5-12), p. 68, BC p. 201. 
Decision Letter, p. 3, BC 108. 
Decision Letter, p. 3, BC 108; Applicant testimony, P&Z Hearing Minutes (3-5-12), p. 7, BC 118. 
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55 
56 
b. No adverse affect on other property in the vicinity. 
• River Edge will provide 280 parking spaces for 175 units to satisfy the Boise Zoning 
Ordinance parking requirement of 1.5 spaces per dwelling unit and 1 guest space per 
10 units.55 
• The additional height does not increase the density to the point it exceeds parking 
standards. This should prevent overflow parking from spilling into the 
neighborhood. 56 
• River Edge parking is consistent with parking ratios provided by Boise State 
University housing developments.57 
• River Edge will promote the use of zip-cars and provide 5-6 stalls within the parking 
garage for zip-car use, which may be rented by the hour or by the day. 58 
• River Edge will promote bicycle use, U-bikes and rental bikes and will provide 
secured bicycle parking on site. 59 
• The proposed building height does not obstruct pedestrian views of the river any 
more than a 35-foot building would, and the pedestrian pathway mitigates this 
impact.60 
• The operating characteristics of the multi-family development do not conflict with the 
surrounding uses. The area is comprised of other multi-family developments, office 
and industrial uses that are of similar or greater intensity to River Edge. 61 
• The increase in traffic generated by the development is offset by the potential for 
existing businesses to capitalize on the increase in customers to the surrounding 
neighborhood as well as by access to bus stops and the greenbelt.62 
• The traffic generated by this development is mitigated by its intended use as student 
housing and the fact that the site is served by many modes of transportation. Boise 
Staff Report (2-6-12), p. 3, in Staff Packet (3-5-12), p. 63, BC p. 196. 
Decision Letter, p. 3, BC p. 108; Staff Report (2-6-12), p. 8, in Staff Packet (3-5-12), p. 68, BC p. 201. 
57 Staff testimony, P&Z Hearing Minutes (3-5-12), p. 1, BC p. 112; Boise State University Parking Ratios for 
Select On-Campus Housing Properties (3-2-12) (describing parking to bedroom ration range of .34-.54), BC p. 261; 
Applicant letter (2-27-12), in Staff Packet (3-5-12), p. 43, BC p. 176 (describing 622 bedrooms and 280 parking 
spaces for a parking to bedroom ratio of .45). 
58 Applicant testimony, P&Z Hearing Minutes (3-5-12), p. 4, BC p. 115. 
59 Applicant testimony, P&Z Hearing Minutes (3-5-12), p. 4, BC p. 115. 
60 Decision Letter, p. 3, BC p. 108; Staff Report (2-6-12), pp. 6, 8, in Staff Packet (3-5-12), pp. 66, 68, BC pp. 
199,201. 
61 
62 
Staff Report (2-6-12), p. 8, in Staff Packet (3-5-12), p. 68, BC p. 201. 
Staff Report (2-6-12), p. 8, in Staff Packet (3-5-12), p. 68, BC p. 201. 
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State University provides bus service only one block away, which runs every 
20 minutes on weekdays. The project is next to the greenbelt, which allows a direct 
walking/biking path to Boise State University, which is only ¼ mile away. 63 
Petitioner's criticisms of some of this evidence ( e.g., Petitioner's allegation on page 19 of 
its Brief that some buildings used as a point of comparison for height compatibility have 
different base zoning) do not provide a basis for this Court to overturn the City Council's 
decision. "The agency's factual determinations are binding on the reviewing court, even where 
there is conflicting evidence before the agency, so long as the determinations are supported by 
evidence in the record."64 Further, Petitioner dismisses its own argument, stating on page 20 of 
its Brief: "The Project, at the height requested, arguably may be compatible with other buildings 
in the area." 
Petitioner has not established that the City Council's approval of the CUP was 
unsupported by substantial evidence in the record. 
5. The City Council's approval of the CUP was not arbitrary, capricious or an 
abuse of discretion (Idaho Code§ 67-5279(3)(e)). 
Petitioner argues that the City Council's decision was arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of 
discretion because the P &Z did not consider parking effects on the surrounding neighborhood. 65 
This argument has no merit. 
As described above, the core authorities in this case are BCZO § 11-06-04.13(C) (in the 
CUP Ordinance) and BCZO § 11-10-01.01 (Table 1) (in the Parking Ordinance). BCZO § 11-
06-04.13 provides that the P&Z "may approve a conditional use permit when the evidence 
presented at the hearing is such to establish ... [seven standards]." BCZO § 11-06-04.13 
63 Decision Letter, p. 3, BC p. 108; Staff Report (2-6-12), p. 7, in Staff Packet (3-5-12), p. 67, BC p. 200. 
64 Whitted v. Canyon County Board ofComm'rs, 137 Idaho 118, 121, 44 P.3d 1173, 1176 (2002); See also, 
Friends of Farm to Market v. Valley County, 137 Idaho 192, 196, 46 P.3d 9, 13 (2002). 
65 Petitioner's Brief at 21, 23. 
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( emphasis added). Only one of these seven standards addresses parking: BCZO § l l-06-
04. l 3(C), which provides: 
That the site is large enough to accommodate the proposed use and 
all yards, open spaces, pathways, walls and fences, parking, 
loading, landscaping and such other features as are required by this 
title. 
( emphasis added.) The parking "required by this title" for the proposed use is set forth in BCZO 
§ 11-10-01.01 (Table 1), which requires 1.5 spaces per dwelling unit plus 1 guest space per 10 
units. T~e undisputed evidence in the record shows that River Edge meets this parking standard 
by providing 280 on-site parking spaces for 175 units.66 
The first step in interpreting an ordinance is to look at the plain language of the 
enactment. If the language is unambiguous, the analysis ends there. 67 If the ordinance is 
ambiguous, the City's interpretation is entitled to a "strong presumption of validity."68 The 
City's interpretation may be overturned only if it is "capricious, arbitrary or unreasonable."69 
The plain language of BCZO § ll-06-04.13(C) and BCZO § 11-10-01.01 (Table 1) 
supports the City's decision that the standards in the Parking Ordinance control. The only CUP 
standard addressing parking defers to the Parking Ordinance, which includes uniform standards 
for all uses, a requirement of LLUPA.70 Nothing in the plain language of the compatibility or 
66 Staff Report (2-6-12), pp. 3-5, in Staff Packet (3-5-12), pp. 63-65, BC pp. 196-198; Applicant Letter (2-27-
12), p. 1, BC 176; Applicant Letter (11-28-11), p. 1, BC p. 181; Applicant testimony, P&Z Hearing Minutes (3-5-
12), p. 3, BC p. 114. Further, Petitioner's Brief does not allege any deficiency with meeting this CUP standard and 
Petitioner did not allege any deficiencies with meeting this CUP standard in its appeal to City Council. 
61 Payette River Property Owners Ass'n v. Bd ofComm'rs of Valley County, 132 Idaho 551,557,976 P.2d 
477,483 (1999). 
68 In re Jerome County Bd. Of Comm 'rs, 281 P.3d 1076 (Idaho 2012); Krempasky v. Nez Perce County 
Planning and Zoning, 150 Idaho 231, 235, 245 P.3d 983, 987 (2010); See also, Noble v. Kootenai County ex rel. 
Kootenai County Bd ofComm'rs, 148 Idaho 937,940,231 P.3d 1034, 1037 (2010). 
69 
70 
Lane Ranch, 145 Idaho at 91, 175 P.3d at 780. 
Idaho Code§ 67-6511. 
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adverse impact standards requires the City to consider a different parking standard for a height 
CUP.71 
Petitioner argues at page 18 of its Brief that the express parking requirement in BCZO 
§ 11-06-04.B(C) - which falls within the City's conditional use permit standards - only applies 
to allowed uses and not cqnditional uses. This argument is contradicted by the plain language of 
the CUP Ordinance. As noted above, the P&Z "may approve a conditional use permit when the 
evidence presented at the hearing is such to establish ... That the site is large enough to 
accommodate the proposed use and all yards, open spaces, pathways, walls and fences, parking. 
loading, landscaping and such other features as are required by this title." BCZO § 11-06-04.14C 
(emphases added). Petitioner's provision of 280 on-site parking spaces for 175 units meets this 
standard; therefore the P&Z "may approve" the CUP on that basis. 
Even if the Court deems the CUP and Parking Ordinances to be ambiguous, the City's 
interpretation is not "capricious, arbitrary or unreasonable." 72 At the outset, it is reasonable for 
the City to rely simply on the express reference in BCZO § 11-06-04.13(C) tying compliance to 
the Parking Ordinance. The City has adopted detailed parking standards in the Parking 
Ordinance, which Petitioner has not challenged. The City quite reasonably is not obliged to 
revisit those standards in reviewing every CUP and could reasonably conclude that a use meeting 
the requirements of the Parking Ordinance will be compatible with its neighbors and will not 
cause an adverse impact because the Parking Ordinance adequately ensures there will be enough 
parking on-site not to adversely impact surrounding properties. 
Further, the City could reasonably focus on BCZO § 11-06-04.13(C) and discount the 
importance of the compatibility and adverse impact criteria in this case because a height 
71 
72 
BCZO § 11-06-04.13(A) and (D). 
See Lane Ranch, 145 Idaho at 91, 175 P.3d at 780. 
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exception CUP is an unusual form of CUP. The issue in this kind of CUP is not the use; the 
multi-family use is an approved use in the R-O zone. Rather, the issue is only to assess the 
impact of the height on surrounding properties. BCZO § 11-06-04.13(C) is directly relevant to 
this consideration in that it focuses on the size of the site and places a natural limit on the height 
because the developer can only include the number of units for which the required number of 
parking spaces to serve those units will fit within the site. 
The compatibility and adverse impact criteria that Petitioner alleges the City failed to 
address do not have the same natural connection to a height CUP. These criteria make sense 
when the permit is about use: e.g. is a warehouse, with the attendant noise, truck traffic and 
hours of operation, compatible with residential neighbors? Does it have adverse impacts on 
neighbors that can be mitigated through conditions in a CUP? When compatibility and adverse 
impact are about height, the application of these criteria is more narrow: i.e. what impact does 
the building height have on neighbors? The City addressed this issue sensibly by looking at 
whether River Edge is a similar height to nearby buildings, which it is. Meanwhile, Petitioner 
faults the City for not assessing a much more indirect connection, that more height means more 
units means more parking means more impact means less compatibility. Yet, nowhere does 
Petitioner demonstrate that it was "arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable" for the City to conclude 
that the adequacy of the parking is decided by the CUP and Parking Ordinance provisions that 
specifically address this issue, as compared to provisions that relate only indirectly to parking, if 
at all. 
In short, no provision of LLUP A or the BCZO requires specific consideration of parking 
for a CUP except as to whether the parking spaces required by the BCZO fit within the site-a 
fact that is both true and unchallenged. 
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Further, notwithstanding the clarity of the ordinances, the testimony and other evidence 
in. the record reflects a substantial discussion showing the reasonableness of applying the Parking 
Ordinance requirements to River Edge. As summarized above, River Edge will provide student 
housing that will require parking in a ratio comparable to similar BSU housing developments.73 
River Edge promotes zip cars and bicycle use and is located adjacent to the greenbelt, 
downtown, and Boise State University, with bus shuttle service to the campus.74 And, the 
additional height requested by the CUP does not increase the number of units to the point it 
exceeds the BCZO's parking standards, which should prevent overflow parking from spilling 
into the neighborhood. 75 
The City Council reasonably interpreted all BCZO requirements for the CUP. Petitioner 
has not established that the City Council's approval of the CUP was arbitrary, capricious or an 
abuse of discretion. 
C. No substantial right of Petitioner has been prejudiced, as required by Idaho 
Code§ 67-5279(4). 
Regardless of any alleged error specified in Idaho Code§ 67-5279(3), the City Council's 
approval of the CUP must be affirmed unless "substantial rights of the appellant have been 
prejudiced."76 Mere conclusory allegations that property rights have been prejudiced are not 
sufficient to prove prejudice to substantial rights. 77 Petitioner has not met this burden and, 
therefore, its prayer for relief must fail. 
73 Staff testimony, P&Z Hearing Minutes (3-5-12), p. 1, BC p. 112; Boise State University Parking Ratios 
for Select On-Campus Housing Properties (3-2-12), BC p. 261; Applicant letter (2-27-12), in Staff Packet (3-5-12), 
p. 43, BC p. 176. 
74 
75 
76 
77 
Applicant testimony, P&Z Hearing Minutes (3-5-12), p. 4, BC p. 115. 
Decision Letter, p. 3, BC p. 108; Staff Report (2-6-12), p. 8, in Staff Packet (3-5-12), p. 68, BC p. 201. 
Idaho Code§ 67-5279(4). 
Krempasky v. Nez Perce County Planning and Zoning, 150 Idaho 231,235,245 P.3d 983,987 (2010). 
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Petitioner alleges its substantial rights were prejudiced because the P&Z granted the CUP 
"without following the proper procedure."78 . However, as discussed above, Petitioner has not 
identified any procedural flaw in the approval and in fact all procedural requirements for the 
CUP application and associated hearings were met. Petitioner's disagreement with the City 
Council's interpretation of its own ordinances or with the City Council's substantive conclusions 
does not create an unlawful procedure. 
Petitioner also argues: "The City specifically did not address the conditional use criteria 
established in City Code. The failure to adopt such findings and conclusions, alone, is sufficient 
to prejudice a substantial right of Petitioners."79 As discussed above, the City is not required to 
adopt specific findings and conclusions addressing each standard but rather must simply adopt a 
reasoned statement that explains the rationale for the decision based on the relevant law and 
facts, which it did. 
Even though the P&Z was not required to consider (or even allow) testimony on topics 
such as parking concerns given that the applicable parking standards were met, the P&Z did not 
prohibit Petitioner from presenting such testimony, and both Petitioner and Intervenor submitted 
a great deal of testimony and evidence regarding parking into the record. 80 
Petitioner has not established how the City Council's decision to grant River Edge a 
height exception, made in accordance with the BCZO, prejudices Petitioner's substantial rights. 
Petitioner is not entitled to any particular view from its office building, and Petitioner has no 
78 
79 
Petitioner's Brief at 24. 
Petitioner's Brief at 26. 
80 Petitioner testimony, P&Z Hearing Minutes (3-5-12), pp. 10-11, BC pp. 121-122; Applicant testimony 
P&Z Hearing Minutes (3-5-12), pp. 3, 4, 14, BC pp. 114-115, 125; Petitioner testimony, City Council Hearing 
Minutes (4-17-12), pp. 6-11, 27, 29-31, 33-34; Applicant testimony, City Council Hearing Minutes (4-17-12), pp. 
17-19, 21-23, 25, 31-33. 
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right to more process or stricter standards for a neighbor's CUP than are set forth in the BCZO. 
River Edge meets all applicable setbacks and improvement standards, including parking. 
D. Petitioner is not entitled to attorneys' fees. 
Petitioner argues it is entitled to attorneys' fees under Idaho Code § 12-117 because the 
City "failed to follow City Code procedures" and to "provide written :findings" in accordance 
with the Idaho Code.81 Petitioner's Brief does not indicate whether it seeks attorneys' fees from 
the City alone or from both Intervenor and the City. We will allow the City to speak for itself, 
but to the extent Petitioner seeks attorneys' fees from Intervenor, its request must be denied. 
First, Petitioner's request for attorneys' fees was not properly pled in accordance with 
applicable rules for a Petition for Judicial Review. Idaho Appellate Rule 41(a) requires that the 
attorneys' fees request be made "in the first appellate brief ... as provided by Rules 35(a)(5) and 
35(b)(5)."82 Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a)(5) requires the appellant to identify its attorneys' fee 
claim "in the division of issues on appeal." Petitioner did not include a demand for attorneys' 
fees in its Issues on Appeal, 83 and therefore this Court should disregard this issue. 
Second, even if this Court finds Petitioner's demand sufficient, an award of attorneys' 
fees is not warranted under Idaho Code§ 12-117. "To award attorney fees under I.C. § 12-117, 
the Court must not only find that the Board acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law, but it 
must also find in favor of the party requesting fees."84 In assessing an award of fees under this 
statute, the Idaho Supreme Court looks to "determine whether there was no authority at all for 
81 Petitioner's Brief at 26. 
82 A judicial review petition to this Court subject to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84(r), which directs that 
the Idaho Appellate Rules apply to any procedure not specified in Rule 84. Because I.R.C.P. 84 does not prescribe a 
method for requesting attorney fees, I.AR. 41 (a) is applicable. 
83 
84 
Petitioner's Brief at 7. 
Neighbors for a Healthy Gold Forkv. Valley County, 145 Idaho 121, 138, 176 P.3d 126, 143 (2007). 
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the agency's actions."85 As set forth herein, the City Council had clear authority to affirm the 
P&Z's issuance of the CUP, and Petitioner's claim that the City failed to follow City Code 
procedures and to provide written findings have no merit. 
Further, Intervenor's involvement in this action has been justified and premised on an 
objectively reasonable belief that the relevant facts and law support the validity of the CUP. As 
such, Petitioner's demand for attorneys' fees must be denied. 
E. Intervenor is entitled to attorneys' fees. 
Intervenor intervened in this case to protect the substantial investment it has made in 
River Edge and to avoid the cost of further construction delays. The analysis presented herein 
demonstrates that Petitioner lacked a reasonable factual or legal basis to challenge the CUP. In 
particular, Petitioner's argument that the P&Z was required to consider testimony about parking, 
beyond the standards plainly stated in the CUP and Parking Ordinances, has absolutely no basis 
in law. Further, the City Council properly determined that the P&Z decision was not erroneous 
based on BCZO standards and testimony in the record. Petitioner has not provided any 
reasonable argument for this Court to overturn that decision under applicable standards for 
review. 
Accordingly, Intervenor is entitled to be reimbursed for its reasonable attorneys' fees 
incurred in this appeal under Idaho Code§ 12-117(1), which provides: 
Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any proceeding involving as adverse 
parties a state agency or a political subdivision and a person, the state agency, 
political subdivision or the court hearing the proceeding, including on appeal, 
shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and other 
reasonable expenses, if it finds that the nonprevailing party acted without a 
reasonable basis in fact or law. 
85 Wohrle v. Kootenai County, 147 Idaho 267, 276, 207 P.3d 998, 1007 (2009) (citing Ralph Naylor Farms, 
L.L.C. v. Latah County, 144 Idaho 806,809,172 P.3d 1081, 1084 (2007). 
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The Court is authorized tQ award fees under Idaho Code § 12-117 tQ a prevailing 
applicant/intervenor, which is a party for all purposes under applicable authority.86 
V. CONCLUSION 
Petitioner's argument that the City Council unlawfully affirmed the P&Z's determination 
with regard to parking, or any other aspect of the CUP, has no reasonable basis in law or fact. 
The City Council properly decided based on an interpretation its own ordinances and the record 
of the case to uphold the P&Z's decision. 
Petitioner has not met its burden to establish (i) that when the City Council affirmed the 
P&Z's approval of the CUP, it erred in at least one of the standards of review specified in Idaho 
Code § 67-5279(3), and (ii) that Petitioner's substantial rights have been prejudiced in 
accordance with Idaho Code§ 67-5279(4). Therefore, this Court must affirm the City Council's 
decision. 
Intervenor respectfully requests this Court to affirm the City Council's approval of the . 
CUP and to order Petitioner to pay Intervenor's attorneys' fees incurred in this appeal. 
Attorneys for Intervenor Royal Boulevard 
Associates LP 
86 Draper v. Board of Comm'rs of Ada County, Case No. CV OC 0209940D, (4th Dist. December 4, 2003) 
(awarding attorneys' fees to intervenor) (attached hereto as Exhibit A): See also Rural Kootenai Org., Inc. v. Bd of 
Comm'rs, 133 Idaho 833, 846 (2000) (awarding attorneys fees against intervenor under Section 12-117); Gold 
Hunter Mining & Smelting Co. v. Holleman, 2 Idaho 839, 27 P. 413, 414 (1891) (holding that intervenor's rights are 
as comprehensive as the rights of the original parties to the suit). 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
EDWARD A. DRAPER, and DEA J. 
DRAPER, husband and wife, 
Petitioners, Case No. CV OC 0209940D 
vs. 
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS of ADA 
COUNTY, a political subdivision of the 
State of Idaho, 
Respondent, 
and 
BRIGHTON CORPORATION, 
Respondents in Intervention. 
BACKGROUND 
DECISION AND ORDER 
ON APPEAL 
This matter is before the Court pursuant to a petition for judicial review 
filed by Petitioners Edward and Dea Draper (the Drapers). The Drapers are 
appealing a decision by the Ada County Board of Commissioner (the Board) 
approving a master site plan submitted by the Brighton Corporation (Brighton). 
The Drapers are residents who live near property, owned by Brighton, 
which is zoned M1, limited industrial. Brighton applied to the Board for 
Decision and Order on Appeal Page 1 
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permission to build and operate warehouse buildings. The application went 
through all the proper procedures and was approved by the Board in November 
of 2002. The Drapers then filed this judicial review on December 18,,2002. 
DISCUSSION 
The Drapers first argue that the Board abused its discretion by not 
considering compatible development issues. The Drapers concede that 
Brighton's proposed project meets the minimum zoning requirements and fits 
within the allowed uses for an M1 zone, but continue on to argue that the Board 
failed to fully evaluate the compatible development issues. 
The five specific objections alleging abuse of discretion presented by the 
Drapers are light and lighting, noise, traffic, hours of operation, and whether the 
actual use planned for the property will allow trucking activity that will have the 
same impact on surrounding properties as would a terminal trucking activity, 
which is prohibited in M1 zones. Regarding the first four objections, the record 
has sufficient evidence to support the Board's approval of the project. The Ada 
County Code established standards for lighting, as well as noise. The Ada 
County Highway District found that the existing transportation system could 
handle the additional traffic and the Brighton's plan provides for most of the 
loading to take place indoors. The Board's decision will not be disturbed merely 
because there is conflicting evidence in the record. 
The Board properly reviewed substantial evidence, made sure the 
standards in the statute were met, and did not abuse its discretion in approving 
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the master site plan. Additional compatibility does not arise as an issue when 
the proposal fits within the statute, as Brighton's warehouse proposal fits within 
the statute. 
Any further arguments regarding the specific standards allowed in an M1 
zone and the comprehensive plan are issues of zoning and are untimely. The 
land at issue in this proceeding was rezoned in March of 2000 and no appeal of 
that decision was taken. 
The Drapers second main argument is that the Board abused its 
discretion in refusing to consider whether truck delivery uses included in 
Brighton's proposed master site plan would have the same impact on 
surrounding existing residential, agricultural, and commercial uses as truck 
terminal operations that are prohibited in M1 zones. Brighton submitted a 
proposal to use the land at issue for a warehouse. Evidence in the record, 
including the design of the buildings, as well as testimony by an architect and a 
real estate professional, supports Brighton's statement that the area will be used 
as a warehouse. The proposed warehouse use is within the allowed uses for an 
M1 zone. The Board was well within its discretion to approve the proposed 
warehouse project and properly did not expand its perception of the proposed 
project as that of a truck terminal. 
Argument that the Drapers may have a future claim against Brighton 
regarding the actual use of the property is just that, a future claim. Potential 
problems are not yet ripe for judicial action. This Court will not consider 
speculation as to the problems that may or may not arise. 
I 
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ATTORNEY FEES 
This Court further finds that Brighton is entitled to reasonable attorney 
fees. I.C. § 12-117. The petition, as brought by the Drapers, was without a 
reasonable basis in fact or law. The approved proposal was admittedly within 
the approved confines of an M1 zone and the argument that the warehouse 
proposal is a truck terminal in disguise is fundamentally flawed. Brighton is 
therefore awarded reasonable attorney fees to be paid by the Drapers. 
CONCLUSION 
The Board exercised appropriate discretion in approving Brighton's 
application. Accordingly the Ada County Board of Commissioner's decision to 
approve the master site plan submitted by the Brighton Corporation is 
AFFIRMED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this ~ day of December, 2003. 
Decision and Order on Appeal 
D. DUFF MCKEE 
Senior District Judge 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
917 LUSK, LLC, an Idaho limited liability ) 
company, ) 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
CITY OF BOISE CITY, a political 
subdivision in the State of Idaho, 
Respondent, 
and 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
ROYAL BOULEY ARD ASSOCIATES, ) 
LP, an Idaho limited partnership, ) 
) 
Intervenor. ) 
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I. 
SUMMARY 
The issue before the Court is not confusing or complex, as the Respondent and Intervenor 
would like the Court to believe. In the straight-forward terms of the Boise City Zoning 
Ordinance ("Zoning Ordinance" or "City Code"), City Code requires the Boise City ("City" or 
"Boise") Planning & Zoning Commission (the "P&Z Commission") to review, as a conditional 
use, any request to exceed any height limit set forth in City Code, and that review and decision 
must be based on the conditional use criteria set forth in City Code. 
Conditional uses, by City Code definition (BCC § 11-06-04.01) "possess characteristics 
that require review and appraisal by the Commission to determine whether or not the conditional 
use would cause any damage, hazard, nuisance or other detriment to persons or property in the 
vicinity" of the conditional use. The P&Z Commission is to appraise items set forth in City 
Code-such as parking-and impose any conditions necessary to establish the findings for 
approval set forth in City Code - such as appropriate conditions of approval related to parking. 
The P&Z Commission violated the procedure set forth in City Code when it explicitly 
refused to appraise and consider parking during its deliberations. No amount of public 
testimony at the P&Z Commission hearings regarding parking can sanitize the P&Z 
Commission's refusal to consider that testimony in its deliberations. The City Council 
("Council") compounded the error when it deliberately ignored the record and upheld the P&Z 
Commission conditional use approval to exceed the City-established height limit. 
The appropriate course of action is for the Court to remand the application back to the 
City, so the City can follow the procedure set forth in City Code. Petitioner's only request to 
Council at its hearing in April 2012 was that the Council remand this matter to the P&Z 
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Commission for the P&Z Commission to go through the portion of the City's process that the 
P&Z Commission missed. Petitioner did not then, and does not now, ask for additional 
process-just the process set out in City Code. Even today, the City could recognize this request 
is still all that Petitioner asks and bring this matter back to the City for further proceedings on its 
own determination. See Idaho Code§ 67-6510 (allowing the City to require mediation "at any 
point during the decision-making process or after a final decision has been made"). 
II. 
REPLY 
A. The Council Erred in Upholding the P&Z Commission's Decision Because the 
Commission Refused to Follow the Conditional Use Procedure Required Under City 
Code for any Request to Exceed a Height Limit Established in City Code. 
The Respondent and Intervenor base their entire response on the following erroneous 
conclusion-City Code Section 11-10-01.01 (Table 1) is the sole authority in City Code 
concerning parking for a conditional use. This position is unsupported by the plain language of 
City Code. BCC §§ 11-04-05.04 (Table 2.1) and (Table 2.2A); 11-04-05.06.D; 11-06-04.14; and 
11-06-06.09; see also 11-10-01.01 (Table 1) (providing parking standards for allowed uses not 
conditional uses). City Code requires a review of parking and the impacts on property in the 
vicinity of a proposed conditional use. The City failed to follow this procedure. 
1. City Code Provides a Clear Procedure for Reviewing a Request for Height Exceptions. 
The language of City Code is clear and unambiguous regarding the procedure for 
reviewing a request for a height exception. BCC § 11-06-06.09. A request for a height 
exception must be based on all of the criteria set forth in Section 11-06-04.13. BCC §§ 11-04-
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05.04 (Table 2.1) and (Table 2.2A); 1 11-04-05.06.D;2 and 11-06-06.09.3 Section 11-06-04.13 
provides in pertinent part: 
The Commission, following the procedures outlined below, may approve a 
conditional use permit when the evidence presented at the hearing is such as to 
establish: 
A. That the location of the proposed use is compatible to other uses in the 
general neighborhood; and 
B. That the proposed use will not place an undue burden on transportation 
and other public facilities in the vicinity; and 
C. That the site is large enough to accommodate the proposed use and all 
yards, open spaces, pathways, walls and fences, parking, loading, 
landscaping and such other features as are required by this title; and 
D. That the proposed use, if it complies with all conditions imposed, will 
not adversely affect other property of the vicinity; and 
E. That the proposed use is in compliance with and supports the goals and 
objectives of the Comprehensive Plan. 
F. Multiple family building (any building containing more than 2 
residential units) must be designed to include features which add to the 
visual and aesthetic appearance of the structure and help prevent a 
sterile, box-like appearance. Such features may include the use of brick 
or stone, roof or facade modulation, planter boxes, bay windows, 
balconies, porches, etc. The Commission or committee must make a 
finding that specific design features have been added to enhance the 
physical appearance of such multiple-family residential structures. 
BCC § 11-06-04.13 ( emphasis added). In addition to the review of the criteria set forth in Section 
11-06-04.13, the P&Z Commission "shall provide that approval of a conditional use permit shall 
1 Respondent and Intervenor conveniently omit Table 2.2A in their discussion about what constitutes an allowed use 
and what is treated as a conditional use. Respondent's Briefp. 45; Intervenor's Brief p. 1. A multi-family dwelling 
taller than thirty-five feet is not an allowed use. It is a conditional use in the R-OD zone. 
2 Section 11-04-05.06.D provides "Height exceptions, except for roof line features meeting the standards of this 
section, shall require a commission-level conditional use permit in accordance with the provisions of Section 11-06-
06.13 [sic] of the Boise City Code." BCC § 11-04-05.06.D. 
3 Section 11-06-06.09 provides "Conditional use approval from the Planning and Zoning Commission is required to 
exceed the height limits set forth in this ordinance." Therefore a conditional use permit that includes a height 
exception must meet the requirements for conditional use permits and the Commission's decision on a height 
exception "shall be based upon the criteria set forth in Section 11-06-04.13 (emphasis added). This does not mean a 
few of the criteria in Section 11-06-04.13, but rather each and every criterion listed in the Section. 
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be contingent upon compliance with specified conditions." BCC § 11-06-04.14 (emphasis 
added); see also Idaho Code§ 67-6512(d). Among those conditions that apply are "requirements 
for off-street parking." BCC § 11-06-04.14.C. 
This does not mean that additional parking conditions must always be imposed for 
conditional uses or that such conditions must always exceed the off-street parking requirements 
for allowed uses found in the standard off-street parking requirements of City Code. It does 
mean, however, that parking must be considered as part of the analysis of a height exception 
request and, where appropriate, conditions related to parking imposed. 
It is not sufficient for the P&Z Commission to consider only a few or even a majority of 
the criteria in Section 11-06-04.13. In the present case, the P&Z Commission was required to 
determine the proposed conditional use would not adversely affect other property in the vicinity. 
That analysis includes whether parking would be sufficient. The P&Z Commission must at the 
very least consider the criteria. The review necessary for a conditional use involves more than a 
mere conclusion that City Code Section 11-10-01.01 (Table 1) provides the appropriate level of 
parking without considering the surrounding circumstances and any of the evidence and 
testimony presented. 
2. Table 1 of Section 11-10-01.01 Does Not Automatically Satisfy the Parking Review 
Requirements for a Conditional Use. 
Respondent and Intervenor claim the phrase "as required by this title" in Section 11-06-
04.13 .C limits the parking requirements for a conditional use to only those standards found in 
City Code Section 11-10-01.01 (Table 1). Intervenor's Briefp. 15; Respondent's Briefp. 14. 
This would be just plain silly if it were not an attempt by Respondent and Intervenor to read 
conditional uses out of City Code. Section 11-06-04.13.C reads: "That the site is large enough to 
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accommodate the proposed use and all yards, open spaces, pathways, walls and fences, parking, 
loading, landscaping and such other features as are required by this title." The phrase "as 
required by title" refers to the laundry list ofland use components listed in Section 11-06-04.13, 
not the standards applicable to those land use components. 
Respondent and Intervenor's argument ignore a basic rule of statutory interpretation that 
requires all provisions of an ordinance to be read to give each effect. Poison Creek Pub. Inc. v. 
Central Idaho Pub., Inc., 134 Idaho 426, 431, 3 P .3d 1254, 1259 (Ct. App. 2000). If, as 
Respondent and Intervenor argue, a conditional use needs only to meet the off-street parking 
requirements of Section 11-10-01.01 (Table 1) for allowed uses without any further review, the 
language of Section 11-06-04.14.C related to off-street parking conditions would be read out of 
City Code, violating this basic rule of statutory construction. 
Further, Section 11-10-01.01 (Table 1) is not the only provision of "this" zoning title that 
applies to parking. The parties have cited at least two sections of "this title" that are applicable 
to off-street parking. The first is City Code Section 11-10-01.01 (Table 1 ), which Respondent 
and Intervenor cite, that sets forth the standard off-street parking requirements for allowed uses.4 
The second is City Code Section 11-06-04.14.C that allows the P&Z Commission to include a 
condition of approval for off-street parking for conditional uses. The two sections do not 
4 Respondent and Intervenor attempt to separate the height from the multi-family residential nature of the proposed 
conditional use. Respondent's Brief pp. 4-5; Intervenor's Briefp. 1. The two cannot be separated. The proposed 
conditional use is for a height exception for a multi-family dwelling. A multi-family dwelling thirty-five feet or 
shorter is an allowed use. BCC §§ 11-04-05.04 (Table 2.1) and (Table 2.2A); 11-04-05.06.D. A multi-family 
dwelling taller than thirty-five feet constitutes a conditional use. BCC §§ 11-04-05.04 (Table 2.1) and (Table 
2.2A); 11-04-05.06.D. 
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contradict each other. They work side by side, with the former controlling the requirements for 
allowed uses and the latter requiring a case-by-case analysis for conditional uses. 
The P&Z Commission cannot merely plug a use into Table 1 of Section 11-10-01.01 and 
call it appropriate parking for a conditional use without further deliberation. If that were the 
case, there would be no need for Section 11-06-04.14.C allowing a condition of approval for 
parking requirements. This makes further sense in light of Section 11-06-04.13.C, which 
requires the P&Z Commission to consider parking, and Section 11-06-04.13.D, which requires 
the P&Z Commission to determine that, if the conditional use complies with all conditions 
imposed, the conditional use will not adversely affect other property in the vicinity of the 
conditional use. The P&Z Commission would not need to consider parking and would not need 
to attach a separate condition of approval tied to parking for the conditional use if all that is 
required is a mathematical calculation under Section 11-10-01.01 (Table 1). 
3. The P&Z Commission Did Not Consider Any Evidence Regarding Parking and the 
Council Ignored the Record Demonstrating This Error. 
Respondent and Intervenor want the Court to believe that holding a hearing and allowing 
citizens to testify is all that is required regardless of whether the P&Z Commission actually 
followed the procedure and deliberately consider the testimony and evidence. This is an 
unsupportable position. 
The P&Z Commission absolutely refused to consider any evidence related to parking, 
including the abundant evidence and testimony submitted by Petitioner that the Project did not 
provide adequate parking for a structure of its height and would, as a result, adversely affect 
other property in vicinity. BC-123 to 124,229 to 231, and 247. This refusal was based on the 
same erroneous reading of City Code that Respondent and Intervenor continue to promote: that 
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City Code Section 11-10-01.01 (Table 1) contains the sole authority for evaluating parking for a 
conditional use. 
The record is replete with evidence showing the P&Z Commission refused to consider 
parking impacts. City planning staff instructed the P&Z Commissioners that parking was not an 
"issue before the Commission tonight." BC-112. The P&Z Commission Chair, Commissioner 
Stevens, further stated at the beginning of deliberations: 
I want to remind the Commissioners that the parking issue tonight is not actually 
before us. This Commission is not in position to make findings that require our 
applicant to be held to standards above that which is in our code. That would be 
arbitrary and would make the City be in some serious hot water, so I want to 
make sure that when we have our discussion tonight, that we keep the parking out 
of it. It is not before us. 
BC-126 (emphasis added). 
Contrary to the statement above, what was arbitrary was not considering parking impacts 
on the surrounding neighbors. If the P&Z Commission actually considered parking, it might 
have determined that parking was not an issue under Section 11-06-04.13 and, assuming there 
was evidence to support its conclusion, declined to attach additional off-street parking conditions 
as provided by Section 11-06-04.14. By refusing to even deliberate on parking, the P&Z 
Commission acted upon unlawful procedure and, as a result, did not consider the evidence in the 
record. The P&Z Commission's acts were clearly arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of 
discretion. 
The Council propagated this error by failing to remand the application to the P&Z 
Commission for consideration of the parking. More troubling is the fact that the record directly 
contradicts Council's approved "Reason for the Decision," which states "the public record from 
the Planning and Zoning Commission meeting revealed a robust discussion regarding parking." 
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BC-285. No robust discussion occurred. BC-112 and BC-126. Merely allowing Petitioner to 
submit information and testimony regarding parking does not satisfy the procedural requirement 
that the P&Z Commission actually consider parking and the possible adverse effect on property 
in the vicinity and deliberate toward an appropriate decision. 
The Council did not remand the application to the P&Z Commission and did not make 
any effort on its own to examine the evidence related to parking. In fact, the Council completely 
ignored the error that occurred by the P&Z Commission and the record that showed this to be the 
case. Council Member Jordan stated: "there was no indication in the record of uh concern on 
the part of the Commissions [sic] that they perhaps were not receiving complete information to 
deliberate properly." Transcript 4-17-12 p. 35. Council Member McLean stated: "I saw on the 
record a lot of conversation about parking .... " Transcript 4-17-12 p. 36. Council Member 
Clegg opined that "I find it hard to believe that in this many hearings um if there were issues to 
be brought up that they weren't brought up ... l'm convinced given the record at hand that the 
Planning and Zoning Commission did fully uh consider those." Transcript 4-17-12 p. 37. 
The record directly contradicts the conclusions of the Council. The P&Z Commission 
refused to consider any evidence about parking. By upholding the P&Z Commission's approval, 
the Council failed to correct the violation and comply with the standard of review set forth in 
City Code Section 11-03-07.05.5 The P&Z Commission's approval and therefore the Council's 
5 Section 11-03-07.05.G provides: 
"1. If the findings of fact upon which the original decision was based are supported by substantial 
evidence, the City Council shall accept those findings. 
2. If the City Council finds error on a factual finding, the City Council shall modify one or more of the 
findings as warranted by the evidence or substitute its own findings, citing the evidence found that 
supports the substitute findings. 
3. If the decision is supported by the findings, but the City Council is not satisfied with the results in the 
particular case, the City Council may direct appropriate amendments to the underlying policy or 
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decision to uphold that decision were, accordingly, made upon unlawful procedure, not 
supported by substantial evidence in the record, and arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of 
discretion. 
B. Respondent Describes an Incorrect Standard for Standing. 
Respondent repeatedly states the wrong standard for standing. Respondent City of 
Boise's Brief Opposing Petition for Judicial Review ("Respondent's Brief') pp. 6-10. Petitioner 
does not need to prove damages to establish standing as alleged by Respondent. Rather, "[t]o 
have standing in a land-use case, the petitioner needs to allege. not prove, only that the 
development could potentially harm his or her real estate interests." Hawkins v. Bonneville 
regulatory documents to apply to future applications, but may not modify, remand or reverse a decision 
based on such future amendments. 
4. If there is not substantial evidence to support the findings upon which the original decision is based, 
the decision shall be reversed. The City Council shall substitute its own findings when the findings from 
the review body are not supported by substantial evidence. 
5. If the original decision is not fully supported by the findings, the City Council may: 
(a) examine the evidence to determine whether additional findings could be supported, make those 
additional findings and then review the original decision; 
(b) make such decision as is supported by the findings; or 
(c) uphold the review body, putting additional conditions on the application as warranted by the facts. 
6. If a substantial procedural error has taken place, the City Council may remand the matter for further 
proceedings. 
7. Because the decision-makers below are experts having recognized expertise in their substantive areas, 
the City Council shall give due consideration to a reasonable interpretation of a City ordinance adopted 
by the review body. 
8. The City Council may find error on the following grounds: 
(a) The decision below is in violation of constitutional, State or City law. An example would be that the 
review body's decision would be a taking or failed to comply with mandatory notice required under the 
Local Land Use 
Planning Act. 
(b) The review body's decision exceeds its statutory authority. An example would be when there is no 
authority for the decision in federal or Idaho law, or local ordinance. 
(c) The decision below is made upon unlawful procedure. An example would be if notice of the hearing 
was inadequate. 
(d) The decision below is arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion. For the review body's actions to 
be deemed 'arbitrary or capricious,' it must be shown that its actions were without rational basis; or in 
disregard of the facts and 
circumstances presented. Where there is room for two opinions, action is not arbitrary and capricious 
when exercised honestly and upon due consideration. 
(e) The decision below is not supported by substantial evidence." 
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County Bd. of Com'rs, 151 Idaho 228,231,254 P.3d 1224, 1227 (2011) (emphasis added) (citing 
Evans v. Teton Cnty., 139 Idaho 71, 76, 73 P.3d 84, 89 (2003)). Petitioner clearly met this 
pleading standard. 
The foundation of Respondent's argument about why Petitioner does not have standing 
rests solely on the same incorrect reading of the conditional use sections of City Code that lead 
Respondent to claim the Project only needs to satisfy the off-street parking requirements for 
allowed uses - which this is not - found in Section 11-10-01.01 (Table 1 ). Respondent 
essentially argues that because the Project meets the numerical requirements for off-street 
parking of an allowed use under Section 11-10-01.01 (Table 1), there can be no potential harm to 
Petitioner. See Respondent's Brief pp. 8-9. This conclusion flies in the face of the fact that the 
City has legislatively-determined that an extension of set building height can trigger certain 
externalities (such as those related to parking) on surroundings - including Petitioner's property 
- that are unacceptable unless appropriately conditioned. The City, through its City Code, sets 
forth factors, such as parking, that must be considered and, if necessary, need to be appropriately 
conditioned - that is, to go beyond the numerics of off-street parking required for a building that 
is not seeking an extension of height - to prevent harm to the surroundings. Here the P&Z 
Commission refused to consider a factor that the City decreed that it must. 
The most immediate, real, and adverse consequence to Petitioner and other property 
owners in the neighborhood (and the public who travel to and seek to park on public streets in 
order to use Ann Morrison Park) involves the parking crisis created by the City's approval of an 
additional two stories of apartments - with parking tenants - above the allowed height of thirty-
five feet in the R-OD zone without even considering whether appropriate parking conditions 
should be imposed to mitigate adverse impacts. Respondent would have the Court believe that 
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the design of the building with first floor parking and four stories of habitable apartments would 
not exceed the height limit if the first floor of parking were removed. Respondent's Brief p. 9. 
This is not correct. BC-140 to 141. Further, Respondent would have the Court believe that the 
taller building could just be a matter of the Intervenor's design preference with no attendant 
parking problem due to that additional height. Respondent's Briefp. 9. How would the Court 
know? Certainly not from the City, who has not provided the Court with deliberation of the 
potential adverse parking impacts caused by this additional habitable space that is not 
automatically allowed in this zone under City Code. 
The lack of deliberation by the City, and the failure of the City to attach appropriate 
conditions to the conditional use approval, will devalue Petitioner's property, require time and 
expense for Petitioner to police parking on its own property, inconvenience employees and 
visitors to Petitioner's building, cause similar deleterious consequences to the neighborhood 
around the Project, potentially drive business from the neighborhood, and cause adverse 
consequences for patrons of Ann Morrison Park. BC-229 to 231, and 247. Petitioner has clearly 
alleged that the Project could potentially harm its real estate interests. Standing is satisfied. 
C. The Substantial Rights of the Petitioner Were Violated When the P&Z Commission and 
the Council Refused to Follow the Procedure Established in City Code for Approving a 
Conditional Use. 
Respondent and Intervenor correctly note that the Idaho Supreme Court has stated a non-
applicant petitioner must do something more than "show that the [decision maker] substantively 
misapplied its own ordinance" to demonstrate prejudice to a substantial right. Hawkins v. 
Bonneville County Bd. of Com'rs, 151 Idaho 228,333,254 P.3d 1224, 1229 (2011); 
Respondent's Brief pp. 11-12; Intervenor Royal Boulevard Associates LP's Response Brief 
("Intervenor's Brief') p. 19. However, Respondent and Intervenor ignore the rest of the 
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Hawkins decision in which the Idaho Supreme Court held that a non-applicant affected party, 
such as the Petitioner, holds a substantial right to due process and procedural regularity. 
"[E]veryone with a statutory interest in the outcome of a decision is entitled to a 
meaningful notice and a fair hearing before an impartial decision maker." Hawkins, 151 Idaho at 
233,254 P.3d at 1229 (citing Eacret v. Bonner Cnty., 139 Idaho 780, 787, 86 P.3d 494,501 
(2004); Eddins v. City of Lewiston, 150 Idaho 30, 36, 244 P.3d 174, 180 (2010)). Procedural 
regularity means more than notice and a chance to speak at a hearing. See Jasso v. Camas 
County, 151 Idaho 790,796,264 P.3d 897, 903 (2011) (holding that notice and an opportunity to 
be heard are not the only requirements of due process). "[A]ll the parties involved in a land-use 
decision have a substantial right to a reasonably fair decision-making process. Governing boards 
owe procedural fairness not just to applicants but also their interested opponents. Both should 
expect proceedings that are free from procedural defects that might reasonably have affected the 
final outcome." Hawkins, 151 Idaho at 232,254 P.3d at 1228 (emphasis added) (citing Noble v. 
Kootenai Cnty., 148 Idaho 937, 942-43, 231 P.3d 1034, 1039-40 (2010)). Thus, due process and 
a procedurally fair decision are substantial rights of even a non-applicant petitioner. Id. at 233, 
254 P.3d at 1228. 
In the present case, the P&Z Commission refused to follow the procedure required under 
City Code to review and approve a request for a height exception. The Council then ignored the 
record that showed that refusal. This is not a situation where Petitioner merely disagrees with 
the way the City interpreted a particular parking standard under a City ordinance. Rather, this is 
a situation where the City refused point blank to consider criteria required as part of the 
procedure for reviewing a height exception application. In this case, the P&Z Commission 
explicit refusal to consider parking at all violates the procedure set forth in City Code. 
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The City's failure to follow City Code provisions at issue constitutes a procedural defect. 
City Code Section 11-06-04.01 requires the P&Z Commission to review and determine whether 
the proposed use, including parking, would cause any damage, hazard, nuisance, or other 
detriment to persons or property in the vicinity of the Project. BCC §§ 11-06-04.01. The P&Z 
Commission was then required to make specific findings related to the Project, including 
whether the parking planned for the Project would adversely affect other property in the vicinity. 
BCC §§ 11-04-05.04 (Table 2.1) and (Table 2.2A); 11-06-04.13; and 11-06-06.09. Finally, the 
P&Z Commission was required to attach any necessary conditions of approval, including off-
street parking requirements, to mitigate any damages, hazards, nuisances, or other detriments. 
BCC § 11-06-04.01. The P&Z Commission did none of this. 
The P&Z Commission not only failed to deliberate about the parking, but it explicitly 
refused even to consider parking issues. When the P&Z Commission refused to consider 
parking, which is required procedure under City Code, it violated the substantial rights of the 
Petitioner and other affected parties. 
The Council's decision to uphold the P&Z Commission's approval merely rubber 
stamped what was already a defective process. The Council's decision also completely ignored 
the plain record before the Council. Not only did the Council's decision run counter to the 
substantial evidence in the record, but it wholly contradicted the only evidence in the record 
involving the P&Z Commission's lack of deliberations about parking. For the Council to state 
that the P&Z Commission reached its decision after a "robust discussion" ignores the record of 
what actually occurred before the P&Z Commission. 
The Council was in error. Hence, the Council's decision to uphold the P&Z 
Commission's approval violated the standard of review set forth in City Code. BCC § 11-03-
REPLY BRIEF - 16 
000107
07.05. Therefore, the P&Z Commission's approval and the Council's decision to uphold that 
decision were made upon unlawful procedure, not supported by substantial evidence in the 
record, and arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion. 
D. Because the P&Z Commission and the Council Refused to Follow the Procedure 
Established in City Code for Approving a Conditional Use, They Could Not Provide 
Findings that Complied with Idaho Code Section 67-6535. 
The plain language of City Code requires the P&Z Commission to address all of the 
criteria set forth in City Code Section 11-06-04.13. BCC §§ 11-04-05.04 (Table 2.1) and (Table 
2.2A); 11-04-05.06.D; 11-06-04.13; and 11-06-06.09. When the P&Z Commission explicitly 
refused to consider parking, the P&Z Commission deliberately chose not to consider a matter 
that the City had legislatively-determined was relevant to be considered when appraising a height 
exception request. 
Intervenor claims the Council could ignore parking because parking was not relevant. 
Intervenor's Briefp. 9. However, Respondent and Intervenor do not dispute that City Code 
Section 11-06-04.13 is relevant. Because that Section, especially when read in conjunction with 
other Sections of City Code (11-04-05.04 (Table 2.1) and (Table 2.2A); 11-04-05.06.D; 11-06-
04.13; and 11-06-06.09), mandate parking to be considered, the P&Z Commission had to 
consider parking in order to make the necessary findings required pursuant to Idaho Code 
Section 67-6535. When the P&Z Commission refused to consider parking at all, as is required 
by City Code, it could not provide a "reasoned statement that explains the criteria and standards 
considered relevant, states the relevant contested facts relied upon, and explains the rationale for 
the decision based on the applicable provisions of the comprehensive plan, relevant ordinance 
and statutory provision, pertinent constitutional principles and factual information contained in 
the record." Idaho Code§ 67-6535(2). The Council then perpetuated the error by failing or 
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refusing to acknowledge what the record showed-that the P&Z Commission refused to follow 
the procedure established by City Code. 
E. Petitioner Is Entitled to an Award of Attorneys' fees. 
Generally, the failure to include an issue in the statement of issues limits the ability of the 
Court to consider that issue on appeal. State v. Prestwich, 116 Idaho 959, 961, 783 P.2d 298, 
300 (1989), overruled on other grounds, State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 842 P.2d 660 (1992); 
Crown v. State, Dept. of Agric., 127 Idaho 188,190,898 P.2d 1099, 1101 (Ct. App. 1994) affd 
in part, rev'd in part .. 127 Idaho 175, 898 P.2d 1086 (1995). However, this rule is relaxed where 
the issue or issues were addressed by authorities cited or arguments contained in the briefs. 
Prestwich, 116 Idaho at 961, 783 P.2d at 300; Crown, 127 Idaho at 190, 898 P.2d at 1101. 
Petitioner's initial brief not only includes a clear heading stating that Petitioner requests an award 
of attorneys' fees, but it also contains substantive argument and authority regarding why an 
award is justified. The request for attorneys' fees is clearly before the Court, and the Respondent 
and Intervenor cannot claim surprise or lack of notice. In fact, Respondent and Intervenor 
responded substantively to Petitioner's request for attorneys' fees in their own briefs. 
Respondent's Brief pp. 16-17; Intervenor's Brief pp. 20-21. No legitimate reason exists for the 
Court to not consider an award of attorneys' fees to Petitioner due to Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a). 
Petitioner is entitled to an award of attorneys' fees because the actions of the City lacked 
a reasonable basis in fact and law. Idaho Code § 12-117(1) and (5). The City acted without a 
reasonable basis in fact or law when: (1) the P&Z Commission failed to follow procedures in 
City Code for considering the height exception request and (2) the Council ignored the facts of 
what occurred before the P&Z Commission. City Code clearly requires the P&Z Commission to 
make a decision on a height exception request based on the conditional use criteria, which the 
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P&Z Commission failed to do. The Council then ignored the record and failed to remand back to 
the P&Z Commission for it do its job. Because the P&Z Commission and the Council clearly 
acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law, Petitioner is entitled to an award of attorneys' 
fees. 
F. Respondent and Intervenor Are Not Entitled to an Award of Attorneys' fees. 
As set forth above, the P&Z Commission and the Council erred and acted without a 
reasonable basis in fact or law. Therefore, the Respondent and Intervenor are not the prevailing 
parties and are not permitted an award of attorneys' fees under Idaho Code Section 12-117. 
VI. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioner merely asks the Court to require the City to follow the procedure established in 
-
its own ordinances. Petitioner respectfully requests that the Court vacate the Council's decision 
and the P&Z Commission's approval and remand the matter back to the City for further 
procedure. 
DATED this 20th day of September 2012. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRIC~t11.1TY 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
917 LUSK, LLC, an Idaho limited ) 
liability company, ) 
) 
Petitioner, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
CITY OF BOISE CITY, a political ) 
subdivision in the State of Idaho, ) 
) 
) 
Respondent, ) 
) 
and ) 
) 
ROY AL BOULEY ARD AS SOCIA TES, ) 
LP, an Idaho limited partnership, ) 
) 
Intervenor. ) 
_______________ ) 
CASE NO. CV-OC-2012-08871 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
This is a petition, filed by 917 Lusk, LLC, an Idaho corporation, (Lusk) seeking 
judicial review of a final decision of the City of Boise1 granting a conditional use permit for 
an apartment complex to be built by Royal Boulevard Associates, LP (Royal), which has 
\ 
intervened in this case.2 For the reasons set forth hereinafter, the City's decision will be 
affirmed. 
1The Boise City Council approved the conditional use permit during a city council meeting. The Planning and 
Zoning Commission had previously held hearings and taken action, which formed the basis for the appeal 
before the council. See Boise City Council Meeting 04-17-12_2 Minutes, at 1-2 (Josh Johnson (with the 
planning department): "[W]e're here tonight to hear an appeal from 917 Lusk LLC for a height exception 
associated with a multi-family structure located at 1004 West Royal Boulevard ... The Planning and Zoning 
Commission correctly determined that parking was not before them as the project meets the parking 
requirements of a multi-family unit."). 
2Royal Boulevard has filed a ''response brief' in this proceeding. 
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briefs: 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The following facts and procedural history are derived from the City's and Lusk's 
This case is an appeal from the determination by the Boise City Council 
('City Council') upholding a decision by the Boise City Planning and 
Zoning Commission ('P&Z') which approved a conditional use permit 
('CUP') for a height exception for Royal Bo~evard Associates, LP 
('Intervenor') to build a multi-family apartment complex called the River 
Edge Apartments ('River Edge'). 
On March 5, 2012, the P&Z unanimously approved the River Edge CUP for 
a height exception and adopted reasons for the decision and conditions of 
approval. 917 Luck, LLC ('Petitioner') filed a timely appeal of the P&Z's 
decision to the City Council, asserting that the P&Z decision failed to meet 
the requirements for'a CUP. On April 1 7, 2012, the City Council denied the 
appeal and upheld the P&Z's approval of the height exception. 
The subject site is 1004 West Royal Boulevard, to the east of Boise's Ann 
Morrison Park and to the west of the property owned by Petitioner. Multi-
family dwellings are an allowed use for this location as the property is 
currently zoned as Residential Office with Design Review Overlay ('R-
OD'). The Local Land Use Planning Act ('LLUPA') and the Boise City 
Zoning Ordinance ('Zoning Ordinance') allow this use to exceed the base 
zoning's standard height limit of 35 feet with the issuance of a CUP. 
Respondent City of Boise's Brief Opposing Petition for Judicial Review, at 
4-5. 
Lusk also notes the following facts: 
In fall 2011, Applicant applied to the City of Boise for permission to build a 
student housing project at 1004 West Royal Boulevard in Boise, Idaho. BC-
184 to 193. The proposed Project consists of a housing structure for Boise 
State University students approximately 352,000 square feet in size and with 
a footprint that would occupy the majority of approximately 3.4 acres 
directly adjacent to the Boise River Greenbelt (the 'Greenbelt'), Ann 
Morrison Park, and Petitioner's property. BC-181, 195. The proposed 
Project would be located in the City's R-OD zone. BC-195. 
The City's Zoning Ordinance prohibits buildings over thirty-five feet in the 
R-OD zone. BCC § 11-04-05.05; Table 2. Applicant could only construct the 
Project at its proposed height of between fifty-nine and sixty-three feet -
nearly double the thirty-five foot height allowed in the R-OD zone-if the 
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City permitted the additional height after analyzing this now conditional use 
under the City Code process .... Petitioner's Brief, at 9. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"The Local Land Use Planning Act (LLUP A) allows judicial review of an approval 
or denial of a land use application for an affected person, as provided for in the Idaho 
Administrative Procedur[ e] Act (IDAP A)." In re Jerome County Board of Commissioners, 
153 Idaho 298, 281 P.3d 1076, 1085 (2012). "For purposes of judicial review of LLUPA 
decisions, a local agency making a land use decision is treated as a government agency 
under IDAPA." Crown Point Development, Inc. v. City of Sun Valley, 144 Idaho 72, 75, 156 
P.3d 573, 576 (2007). 
"This court will not substitute its judgment for that of the [local agency] as to the 
weight of the evidence on questions of fact.'' In re Jerome County, 281 P.3d at 1085. "This 
Court will defer to the [agency's] findings of fact unless the findings are clearly erroneous; 
these factual determinations of the board are binding on a reviewing court when supported 
by substantial and competent evidence in the record, even if there was conflicting evidence 
before the [agency]." Id. 
"This court shall ... affirm the zoning agency's action unless the Court finds that the 
agency's findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are: (a) in excess of constitutional or 
statutory provisions; (b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; ( c) made upon 
unlawful procedure; ( d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or 
( e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion." Id., at 1085-86. 
"A party that challenges a[n agency's] decision must demonstrate first that the 
[agency] erred in a manner specified in I.C. § 67-5279(3), next the party must show that.one 
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of its substantial rights has been prejudiced." Id., at 1086. "'Planning and zoning decisions 
are entitled to a strong presumption of validity; this includes the [agency's] application and 
interpretation of their own zoning ordinances."' Id. This Court will defer to a[n agency's] 
'interpretation and application of its zoning ordinance, unless such interpretation or 
application is capricious, arbitrary or discriminatory."' Id. 
ANALYSIS 
Lusk asserts the following contentions in this petition: (1) "the decision to grant the 
conditional use request, and the Council's refusal to overturn the P&Z Commission decision, 
was in excess of the City Code's authority of the P&Z Commission and the Council;" (2) 
"the P&Z Commission's decision to grant the conditional use request, and the Council's 
refusal to overturn the P &Z Commission decision, was made upon unlawful procedure;" (3) 
the P&Z Commission's decision to grant the conditional use request, and the Council's 
refusal to overturn the P&Z Commission decision, was not supported by substantial 
evidence in the record;" (4) "the P&Z Commission's decision to grant the conditional use 
request, and the Council's refusal to overturn the P&Z decision was arbitrary, capricious, or 
an abuse of discretion;" (5) "the 'Reason for the Decision' [i]ssued by the P&Z Commission 
and approved as modified by the Council were inadequate under LLUP A and City Code, and 
thereby violated Petitioner's due process rights." Petitioner's Brief, at 7. 
1. Standing 
Before addressing the issues raised by Lusk, the Court must first address the City's 
contention that the petitioner does not have standing "under LC. § 67-6521 to seek judicial 
review of the City Council's approval of the River Edge CUP." Respondent City of Boise's 
Brief Opposing Petition for Judicial Review, at 5. The City asserts that Lusk lacks standing 
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because it cannot show "real or substantial harm to [its] property due to City Council's 
approval of the River Edge CUP." Id., at 7. 
Lusk asserts that "[t]he most immediate, real, significant, and anticipated adverse 
consequence to Petitioner and other property owners in the neighborhood (including the 
public who travel to and use Ann Morrison Park) is the parking crisis created by the City's 
approval of an additional two stories of habitable apartments over and above the allowed 
height of thirty-five feet in the R-OD zone - all without appropriate conditions being placed 
on the conditional use request to ensure that adverse impacts are mitigated. In fact, there was 
no discussion, no analysis, and no deliberation by the City to review the potential adverse 
parking impacts caused by this [sic] additional habitable apartments that are not allowed by 
right under the Zoning Ordinance." Petitioner's Brief, at 14. 
"One 'fundamental tenet of American jurisprudence' is 'that a person wishing to 
invoke a court's jurisdiction must have standing.' The three most basic pr?positions of the 
doctrine of standing that our Court uses to guide its decisions [are] ... (1) that standing 
'focuses on the party seeking relief and not on the issues the party wishes to have 
adjudicated;' (2) that in order 'to satisfy the case or controversy requirement of standing, 
litigants generally must allege or demonstrate an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood 
that the judicial relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury;' and (3) that 'a 
citizen and taxpayer may not challenge a governmental enactment where the injury is one 
suffered alike by all citizens and taxpayers of the jurisdiction. Building upon these basic 
propositions, this Court also considers that standing 'may be predicated upon a threatened 
harm as well as a past injury."' In re Jerome County, 281 P.3d at 1086. 
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"Idaho Code section 67-6521(l)(d) allows an 'affected person aggrieved by a 
decision' to seek judicial review ... An affected person is one who has 'an interest in real 
property which may be adversely affected by the issuance or denial of a permit authorizing 
the development.' LC. § 67-6521(l)(a) ... 'an affected person shall mean one having a bona 
fide interest in real property which may be adversely affected by: (i) (t)he approval, denial or 
failure to act upon an application required or authorized pursuant to this chapter."' Id., at 
1087. 
"An affected person shall mean one having a bona fide interest in real property which 
may be adversely affected by: (i) The approval, denial or failure to act upon an application 
for a subdivision, variance, special use permit and such other similar applications required or 
authorized pursuant to this chapter." LC.§ 67-6521(1)(i). 
LC. § 67-6512 provides: "(a) As part of a zoning ordinance each governing board 
may provide by ordinance adopted, amended, or repealed in accordance with the notice and 
hearing procedures provided under section 67-6509, Idaho Code, for the processing of 
applications for special or conditional use permits." 
"Notwithstanding jurisdictional boundaries, notice shall also be provided to property 
owners or purchasers of record within the land being considered, three hundred (300) feet of 
the external boundaries of the land being considered, and any additional area that may be 
substantially impacted by the proposed special use as determined by the commission. Any 
property owner entitled to specific notice pursuant to the provisions of this subsection shall 
have a right to participate in public hearings before a planning commission, planning and 
zoning commission or governing board." LC.§ 67-6512(b). 
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Lusk was entitled to specific notice of the proposed conditional use permit, due to the 
proximity of its property with the proposed project. See Agency Record (hereinafter cited as 
BC) BC-81. "917 Lusk LLC ('Keynetics'), owns the Keynetics Inc. building situated 
immediately east and south of the proposed River Edge Apartment student housing project at 
1004 W. Royal Boulevard .... " BC-81. See also BC-160 (photo showing that 917 Lusk's 
property is adjacent to the proposed apartment project). In addition, "Lusk ... appeal[ ed] the 
Planning and Zoning Commission approval of a height exception to construct a five story 
multi-family residential building on 3.42 acres located at 1004 W. Royal Boulevard in an R-
OD (Residential Office with Design Review) zone." BC-69. In its appeal, Lusk specifically 
argued that "the proposed project will place an undue burden on transportation and other 
public facilities in the vicinity"3 and "the proposed project will adversely affect other 
property in the vicinity."4 BC-84. 
The Court finds that Lusk is "[ a ]n affected person aggrieved by a final decision 
concerning matters identified in section 67-5721(1)(a) ... [entitled to] seek judicial review 
as provided by chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code." LC. § 67-6521(1)(d). Lusk clearly has 
3
"Parking problems created by the higher density associated with the height of the proposed Project will strain 
public facilities in the area. Ann Morrison Park, a City owned park, will be clogged with overflow parking. 
Visitors to the park will not be able to locate parking, and the City will be forced to expend valuable resources 
policing parking areas within the park and along the Greenbelt. As was noted by the City of Boise in its new 
comprehensive plan, Blueprint Boise, 'while many places are tempted to relax standards during uncertain 
economic times, our high expectations will hold value many decades later.' The City should resist pressure to 
make decisions now that will hinder the redevelopment of the area due to impacts of this Project on the 
attractiveness of the immediate vicinity and the Greenbelt." BC-84. 
4
"lnadeqi.iate parking provided by the proposed Project will severely affect nearby properties ... the request for 
a height exception that is nearly twice allowed in the R-OD zone cannot be separated from parking concerns. 
Each added story increases occupant density and the need for additional parking. Because the housing Project 
would include 175 dwelling units (of which 139 are four-bedroom units), it will contain 622 bedrooms and 
house at least 622 student tenants, yet only 280 parking spaces are planned. The application was improperly 
processed as 'multi-family' for purposes of calculating off-street parking requirements. This is a significant 
error because 'multi-family' projects under the City's off-street parking requirements must include only 1.5 
parking spaces per dwelling unit and one guest space per IO units . . . The leasing arrangement further 
demonstrates that the proposed Project is not typical multi-family housing, where the lease covers the entire 
apartment and not, as in this case, a lease for each individual bedroom ... each unit is a bedroom under the 
leasing arrangement." BC-84-85. 
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standing for purposes of seeking judicial review here. See also Hawkins v. Bonneville 
County Board of Commissioners, 151 Idaho 228, 231, 254 P.3d 1224, 1227 (2011) ("To 
have a standing in a land-use case, the petitioner needs to allege, not prove, only that the 
development could potentially harm his ... real estate interests."); Davisco. Foods Int'l, Inc. 
v. Gooding County, 141 Idaho 784, 118 P.3d 116 (2005) (possible odor from several miles 
away conferred standing.). 
2. Authority/Procedure Challenge 
Lusk's first contention is that "the decision to grant the conditional use request, and 
the Council's refusal to overturn the P&Z Commission decision, was in excess of the City 
Code's authority of the P&Z Commission and the Council." Petitioner's Brief, at 7. 
Lusk cites LC. § 67-6512(a), wherein it is stated that "[a] special use permit may be 
granted to an applicant if the proposed use is conditionally permitted by the terms of the 
ordinance, subject to the ability of political subdivisions, including school districts, to 
provide services for proposed use, and when it is not in conflict with the plan." 
Lusk appears to argue that the city's approval of the conditional use permit lacked 
authority because this approval was not "contingent on conditions of approval that would 
mitigate the adverse impacts of the conditional use." Petitioner's Brief, at 17. 
Lusk then goes on to argue, bringing in its other issues, that "the P&Z Commission 
erred by not following the city's conditional use procedure," as well as its contentions that 
the Commission's decision was arbitrary and capricious and not adequately supported or 
supported by substantial evidence. Id. 
Lusk argues "[t]he language of City Code Section 11-06-04.14.C reqmres an 
examination of the off-street parking for any conditional use permit application. The P&Z 
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Commission must consider all of the particulars of the proposed Project, including parking, 
and, as necessary, attach conditions of approval regarding off-street parking ... the P&Z 
Commission did not go through that exercise but made the conclusory statement that there 
was adequate parking in order for Applicant to get the most units out of the site as possible." 
Id., at 19-20. 
The P&Z decision approving the conditional use permit, dated March 6, 2012, 
provides that "[t]he additional height does not increase the density of the project to the point 
where parking standards cannot be met ... [t]he height exception will not place an undue 
burden on transportation and other public facilities ... The project is next to the greenbelt 
that allows a direct walking/biking path that is ¼ mile from BSU ... [t]he height exception 
allows for the applicant to maximize the number of units, while providing adequate parking . 
. .. " March 6, 2012 Planning & Zoning Commission decision (CPUll-00090 & CFHll-
00036 I 1004 W. Royal Boulevard), at 3 (BC-108). 
The P&Z held a hearing prior to issuing its approval decision, on March 5, 2012. The 
hearing minutes note that "[Lusk's] letter ends by stating that there is also a shortage of 
parking and that this issue cannot be separated from the height exception. This building is a 
multi-family dwelling unit and meets our Parking Code. This issue is not before the 
Commission tonight. The application tonight only concerns the additional height requested 
by the applicant." March 5, 2012 Hearing Minutes, at 1 (BC-112) (Josh Johnson - planning 
department). 
During the hearing, Becky McKay (Engineering Solutions, Applicant Team) stated 
that "[ w ]e meet all the parking requirements. They have 1.5 spaces, plus 1 per 10 units, with 
a total of280 spaces. We meet that." (BC-114). 
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Eileen Barber, "an owner and co-founder of Keynetics," testified: 
Part of the issue is since they are doing 4-bedroom units, which is virtually 
unheard of in multi-family housing; true multi-family housing consists 
primarily of 1 and 2-bedroom units. If they actually have all of those as 2-
bedroom, not even a mixture of one and two, they would have 311-units and 
there would be about 500 parking spaces. The fact they have quads and are 
calling this multi-family housing means the project is terribly under parked. 
This project should not be classified as multi-family. College students living 
together are not families. There is nothing in the Boise City Code that fits 
this type of use. I suggest the City consider creating a new residential 
category for private off-campus housing. This is new to Boise. The issue with 
the proposed five floors and the issue of inadequate parldng are the result of 
a density that deserves a more in-depth examination. Boise only has four 
people per acre. That comes right from the census data. Portland is close to 7 
and Seattle is a little over 11. BC-121. ( emphasis added). 
Kate Lenz, Human Resources Director at Keynetics, stated "I just don't see how 
there is ample allocations for cars and bikes for these future students, with the proposal that 
is front of you." Id. 
Makho N gazimbi testified that he had lived at a nearby apartment complex (Morrison 
Park Apartments) since 2008. He works at Keynetics and was a BSU student. He agreed that 
"this development would be a great benefit to the city." However, his 
[M]ain concern is the pressure that this development will have on the already 
limited parking in that part of town. From what I understand the maximum 
capacity would be about 600 people and they will be providing parking for 
about 45 percent ... Chances are the overflow will end up being on Lusk 
Street, Dale, Island and Royal, which are all streets in that area . . . I think 
they tried to emphasize what they do is encourage people not to own 
vehicles. I don't know how you can do that in Boise ... I would urge you to 
consider the impact of this development on surrounding neighborhoods. BC-
121-122. 
Brad Wiskirchsen, CEO of Keynetics, testified: 
The proposal you have before you is clearly not a multi-family housing 
development. It's aimed at students by their own admissions. In fact, it more 
appropriate fits in with the City's definition of fraternity or sorority type of 
living situation, although 622 residents would make an awfully large 
fraternity ... We're not opposed to the development of this particular parcel. 
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In fact, we are excited to welcome new neighbors and say goodbye to the 
truck lot, but ... we're asking the development of the property be done right 
and given consideration of the impacts and influx of people in the 
surrounding areas, including the property's neighbors, and more importantly, 
the City's own assets, the Boise River and Ann Morrison Park. BC-123. 
(emphasis added). 
Dave Kangas, President of the Vista Neighborhood Association, also testified: 
[O]ne of the biggest problems we have with multi-family housing is parking. 
Planning and Zoning will admit that their ordinance does not adequately 
address parking. When you look at a proposal, most multi-family housing 
comes in at two bedrooms and they are allowed so many spots considering 
that formula. If you're going to one bedroom apartment, you have to realize 
that there's probably a couple living there and there's going to be two cars. 
If you have quads and you're gearing towards Boise State students, you're 
·going to have four vehicles and four bikes. That's what they're going to 
have. That's how they get around. From everything I've heard if there's a 
proposed 600 residents and they are allowed 45 bike spaces, give me a 
break. You're imposing big problems on every other business in that area for 
parking. I love the building. I think it's a unique location and a nice 
replacement for that industrial park, but if you have 600 people coming in 
and out of that apartment in the summertime when Ann Morrison Park is full 
of rafters, that whole shoreline from that building from the bridge, all the 
way through the park is going to be trashed by people coming in and out of 
the river ... The parking addressed by the people who have already testified 
is a major issue with multi-family housing throughout the City and all the 
neighborhood associations will testify to that, I would think because that is 
one of the biggest problems in the neighborhoods. BC-124. 
Monika Anderson testified that she lives next to BSU and "parking is a problem. I 
have two roommates and have proper parking for them ... Everybody I know has a car. I 
have two." Id. 
At the conclusion of the hearing, Commissioner Stevens said: "I want to remind the 
Commissioners that tlie parking issue is not actually before us. This Commission is not in 
position to make findings that require our applicant to be held to standards above that which 
is in our code. That would be arbitrary and would make the City be in some serious hot 
water, so I want to make sure that when we have our discussion tonight, we keep tlie 
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parking out of it. It is not before us. !hey have met code and to require that is above and 
beyond what we are allowed to do." BC-126.5 (emphasis added). 
The commission later voted, unanimously, to approve the conditional use permit. 
"This Court exercises free review over the application and construction of statutes. 
Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court must give effect to the 
statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction. The language of the statute is 
to be given its plain, obvious, and rational meaning. If the language is clear and 
unambiguous, there is no occasion for the court to resort to rules of statutory interpretation." 
State v. Salinas, 150 Idaho 771, 772, 250 P.3d 822, 823 (Ct. App. 2011). Statutes are 
interpreted so that the parts make sense of the whole. See Jacobsen v. City of Rathdrum, 115 
Idaho 266,270, 766 P.2d 736, 740 (1988). 
Boise City Code Section 11-06-04.01 (Conditional Use Permits - "Justification") 
states "[ c ]onditional uses by definition possess characteristics such as to require review and 
appraisal by the Commission to determine whether or not the use would cause any damage, 
hazard, nuisance or other detriment to persons or property in the vicinity." (emphasis added). 
Boise City Code Section 11-06-04.13 (Conditional Use Permits - "Criteria and 
Findings") "The Commission, following the procedures outlined below, may approve a 
conditional use permit when the evidence presented at the hearing is such as to establish: A. 
That the location of the proposed use is compatible to other uses in the general 
neighborhood; and B. That the proposed use will not place an undue burden on 
5See also BC-126 (Commissioner Storey: "Like you said parking is off the table. This complies. I ca11't say our 
code is correct 011 parki11g am/ tile way it should be ha11d/ed .... ") (emphasis added), (Commissioner 
Bradbury: "I agree with Commissioner Storey, I think he is correct in ... what our job is tonight."); Boise City 
Council Meeting Minutes, 04-17-12_2, at 36 (Council Member McLean: "There is a parking issue we do need 
to deal with as a City and we've talked about that a little bit and I hope to see that come forward soon."). 
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transportation and other public facilities in the vicinity; and C. That the site is large enough 
to accommodate the proposed use and all yards, open spaces, pathways, walls and fences, 
parking ... and such other features as are required by this title ... D. That the proposed use, 
if it complies with all conditions imposed, will not adversely affect other property of the 
vicinity .... " 
Boise City Code Section 11-06-04.14 (Conditional Use Permits - "Conditional Use; 
Limitations"), states that "[t]he Commission, in acting upon the application, shall provide 
that approval of a conditional use permit shall be contingent upon compliance with specified 
conditions, including but not limited to the following matters . . . C. Volume of traffic 
generated, requirements for off-street parking . . . vehicular movements within the site and 
points of vehicular ingress and egress." (emphasis added). 
Lusk argues that the alleged failure to consider parking as part of the approval 
procedure, both before the P &Z and the City Council, was a procedural ·violation of both the 
conditional use ordinance and due process rights. The Court finds that Lusk's contention is 
in error. It is clear from the record that both P&Z and the Council considered the parking 
issue. Indeed, P&Z reopened the hearing before it to allow presentations on parking by 
Lusk's witnesses. However, both determined that the project as proposed in the CUP 
application met the existing code requirement for parking. It was further noted that the 
project was within walking distance for students and that bicycle parking was provided. 
Since both the P&Z and the Council determined that the project met the current code 
requirements, they determined that there was no need to address the issue further. Although 
some questioned the adequacy of the code itself, it is not within this Court's purview in this 
case to tell the City what the codes should contain. There were no procedural or due process 
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violations here. Likewise, the Court sees no abuse of discretion here, and clearly both P&Z 
and the Council acted within their authority. 
Finally, the Court concludes that Lusk has failed to demonstrate that any other of its 
claimed substantial rights have been violated. There is an allegation that the public parking 
situation may be adversely impacted by the project, but there are no allegations that Lusk's 
property, the use of the property, or its business could be. Rather, Lusk appears to assert that 
parking by tenants of the project could impact the entire area, including Ann Morrison Park, 
but makes no specific argument on its own substantial rights. 
The city contends that "P &Z was never required, by the plain language of the 
ordinance, to condition the River Edge CUP on Boise City Code § 11-06-04.14. This is 
especially true in light of the parking standards set forth in Boise City Code§ 11-10-01.01, 
Table 1, which were applicable to and met by Intervenor." Respondent City of Boise's Brief 
Opposing Petition for Judicial Review, at 12 n.47. 
Boise City Code Section 11-10-01 ("General Parking Standards") provides that 
"[t]his chapter establishes standards for motor vehicle and bicycle parking, on-site 
circulation, loading areas and parking lot design . . . C. The number of required spaces is 
based on the primary use of the site." Lusk has never contended that the proposed project 
does not meet the parking requirements of the applicable zoning ordinance. 
All parties request an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-11 7. That 
statute mandates an award to the prevailing party in any proceeding involving a state agency 
or political subdivision if the Court finds that the non-prevailing party acted without a 
reasonable basis in law or fact. Lusk is not the prevailing party and is not entitled to fees. 
The Court cannot find, however, that it acted without a reasonable basis in law because of 
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the differing views presented as to the interaction between the ordinances setting parking 
standards and the ordinance governing CUP applications. Therefore, attorney fees are 
denied to the City and Royal. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the order of the City Council is affirmed. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this 2,b ~ day of May 2013. 
athryn Sticklen 
Senior District Judge 
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917 LUSK, LLC, an Idaho limited liability ) 
company, ) 
Petitioner/ Appellant, 
vs. 
CITY OF BOISE CITY, a political 
subdivision in the State of Idaho, 
Respondent, 
and 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
ROY AL BOULEY ARD AS SOCIA TES, ) 
LP, an Idaho limited partnership, ) 
Intervenor/Respondent. 
) 
) 
-------------~) 
Case No. CV-OC-2012-08871 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENTS, CITY OF BOISE CITY AND ITS 
ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, BOISE CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, 150 N. CAPITOL 
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BOULEVARD, 4TH FLOOR, BLDG. 2, BOISE, IDAHO 83702, AND ROYAL BOULEVARD 
ASSOCIATES, LP, AND ITS ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, GARY G. ALLEN AND 
DEBORAH E. NELSON, GIVENS PURSLEY LLP, 601 W. BANNOCK STREET, BOISE, 
IDAHO 83702, AND THE CLERK AND THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named Appellant, 917 Lusk, LLC, appeals against the above-named 
Respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Court and Memorandum Decision and Order, 
entered in the above-entitled action on the 31st day of May 2013, Honorable Senior District 
Judge Kathryn A. Sticklen presiding. 
2. Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Court and 
Memorandum Decision and Order described in Paragraph 1 above is appealable under and 
pursuant to Rule ll(f) I.A.R. 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal that Appellant intends to assert in 
the appeal follows, provided any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent Appellant from 
asserting issues on appeal: 
(a) Whether the District Court erred in determining the Boise Planning and 
Zoning Commission and the Boise City Council correctly considered parking as part of 
the approval procedure. 
(b) Whether the District Court erred in determining the application met the 
Boise City Code requirements for conditional use permits. 
( c) Whether the District Court erred in determining the actions of the Boise 
Planning and Zoning Commission and the Boise City Council met the requirements of 
the Boise City Code. 
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( d) Whether the District Court erred in determining the Appellant did not 
suffer prejudice to its substantial rights. 
(e) Whether the District Court erred in not determining whether the Boise 
City Council failed to provide Findings that Complied with Idaho Code§ 67-6535. 
4. Has an order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record? No. 
5. (a) Is a reporter's transcript requested? No. 
(b) Appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the 
reporter's transcript: No transcript is requested. 
6. Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's record in 
addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.AR.: 
• 05/l 7 /2012 - Petition for Judicial Review 
• 08/02/2012 - Petitioner's Brief 
• 08/30/2012 - Respondent City of Boise's Brief Opposing Petition for 
Judicial Review 
• 08/30/2012 - Intervenor Royal Boulevard Associates LP's Response 
Brief 
• 09/20/2012 - Reply Brief 
• 05/31/2013 - Memorandum Decision and Order 
In requesting inclusion of the foregoing documents in the clerk's record, Appellant anticipates 
the entirety of the record and transcripts of the City of Boise Planning and Zoning Commission 
and the Boise City Council, as filed or lodged with the District Court, will be lodged with the 
Supreme Court in accordance with Rule 31, I.AR. 
7. I certify: 
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(a) That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on each reporter of 
whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below: 
Name and address: NIA 
Name and address: 
----------------
Name and address: 
----------------
( b) [ ] That the Clerk of the District Court or administrative agency has been 
paid the estimated fee for preparation of the reporter's transcript. 
(c) [X] That Appellant is exempt from paying the estimated transcript fee 
because no transcript is requested. 
(d) [X] That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's or agency's 
record has been paid. 
(e) [ ] That Appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the 
preparation of the record because __________________ _ 
(f) 
(g) 
(h) 
[X] That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
[ ] That appellant is exempt from paying the appellate filing fee because 
That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to Rule 20 (and the Attorney General of Idaho pursuant to Section 67-1401(1), Idaho 
Code). 
DATED this 12th day of July 2013. 
SPINK BUTLER, LLP 
By: ¥ . > \ \_, L, ...-:1(' 
Richard H. Andrus 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 12th day of July 2013, I caused a true and correct copy 
of the above NOTICE OF APPEAL to be served upon the following individuals in the manner 
indicated below: 
Boise City Attorney's Office 
150 N. Capitol Blvd., 4th Flr., Bldg. 2 
Boise, ID 83702 
P.O. Box 500 
Boise, ID 83701 
Facsimile: 208/384-4454 
Gary G. Allen 
Deborah E. Nelson 
Givens Pursley LLP 
601 W. Bannock Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
P.O. Box 2720 
Boise, ID 83701 
Facsimile: 208/388-1300 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 5 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[X] Hand-Delivery 
[ ] Federal Express 
[ ] Via Facsimile 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[X] Hand-Delivery 
[ ] Federal Express 
[ ] Via Facsimile 
~\_}-, ---_/2../ -
Richard H. Andrus 
000132
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
917 LUSK, LLC, an Idaho limited liability 
company, 
Peitioner-Appellant, 
vs. 
CITY OF BOISE, a political subdivision in 
the State of Idaho, 
Respondent, 
and 
ROY AL BOULEVARD ASSOCIATES, 
LP, an Idaho limited partnership, 
Intervenor-Respondent. 
Supreme Court Case No. 41214 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify: 
There were no exhibits offered for identification or admitted into evidence during the 
course of this action. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the following documents will be submitted as EXHIBITS to 
the Record: 
1. Administrative Record in a Judicial Review. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court this 19th day of August, 2013. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
917 LUSK, LLC, an Idaho limited liability 
company, 
Peitioner-Appellant, 
vs. 
CITY OF BOISE, a political subdivision in 
the State of Idaho, 
Respondent, 
and 
ROY AL BOULEY ARD ASSOCIATES, 
LP, an Idaho limited partnership, 
Intervenor: Respondent. 
Supreme Court Case No. 41214 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of 
the following: 
CLERK'S RECORD 
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows: 
RICHARD H. ANDRUS 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
11.uG 1 9 2013 
Date of Service: ,.,.. 
--------
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
MARY ELIZABETH WATSON 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
GARYG.ALLEN 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
,,, ...... ,,,, ,, ,, 
CHRISTOPHER D. RIC~,'~C)\)~:r 4T!f .h~',,, 
~
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
917 LUSK, LLC, an Idaho limited liability 
company, 
Peitioner-Appellant, 
vs. 
CITY OF BOISE, a political subdivision in 
the State of Idaho, 
Respondent, 
and 
ROY AL BOULEVARD ASSOCIATES, 
LP, an Idaho limited partnership, 
Intervenor-Respondent. 
Supreme Court Case No. 41214 
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing record in 
the above-entitled cause was compiled under my direction as, and is a true and correct record of the 
pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, 
as well as those requested by Counsel. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the 
12th day of July, 2013. 
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
,,, ....... ,,, 
CHRISTOPHER D. RIC~1''o~RT 47'1f'',,,, 
Clerk of the District C~~ c.; .......... ./u/\',,,. 
. :-~.-· ·-~--w $ ,>,; ,• OF ri/1; •00 <) ~ 
- E--.: S1-_ •? -
Li._~"11>:r: By -  ~:c:,: 
Deputy Clerk ';. ~ •. D,11/.o l ~: 
':."Y •• .;::-i~ 
--~ .. ··~.:-
...... PO •••••••••• \,') .... . 
## :f A '\ .. . 
,,, "DA cou~' ,,, ,, ,,, 
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